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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the question of the legality of reservations to international
human rights treaties. The evolution of reservations law demonstrates that the system seek to
promote universal adherence to multilateral treaties through flexible rules that reflects the
superiority of national sovereignty in the international society. However, the flexibility of
reservation law as codified in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties has facilitated
wide acceptance of multilateral treaties at the cost of their integrity. In the case of human
rights treaties, this issue is of paramount importance considering the essentiality of a balance
between integrity and universality for human rights norms. There is an urgent necessity to
promote adequate reforms of the Vienna Convention system and rely on human rights treaty
bodies’ competence and jurisdiction to review the validity of reservations and ensure that
universality and integrity are equally respected.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

It is commonly agreed that the modern international society is subject to an
accelerated process of globalization. The dynamic of globalization is complex, multisided, composed of positive and negative aspects. One important characteristic of this
global phenomenon is what has been called the “globalization of freedom.”1 Although
the spreading of democratic values and human freedoms throughout the globe did not
really constitute “The End of History,”2 it is undeniable that the world as a “global
village” has evolved along a continuous increase of human freedom.3
This trend can be largely observed through the analysis of the evolution of
international law in the last half-century. Since the end of World War II, states are no
longer exclusive actors of the international legal order. Many other entities have
emerged as subjects of international norms: international organizations, corporations,
non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), but most importantly, individuals.4 Indeed,
the greatest achievement of modern international law has been the development of
general rules affirming the rights and freedoms of individuals versus states:
international human rights law.
It is a branch of international public law that has been the subject of growing
academic scrutiny over the past 50 years, mainly because of its novelty and

1

Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L. J.
293, 295 (2002).
2
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (Free Press, 1992).
3
See Hongju Koh, supra note 1, at 295.
4
See LORI F. DAMROSCH, LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD C. PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER, HANS SMIT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, 396-404 (West, 4th ed., 2001).
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ambiguous nature: although the individual is the recipient of the norm, the state
remains the classical subject of the rule.5 Human rights have been the central focus of
modern international law because of their unique nature, resulting from a fundamental
opposition between the two forces driving its evolution. A continuous tension, a
perpetual adjustment between the essential rights and freedoms of individuals, and the
corresponding limitation of states’ sovereignty has characterized the evolution of
modern international law. With the globalization of international affairs, and the everincreasing interdependence among states, the struggle for human freedoms has also
adopted a universal nature. After the atrocities of World War II, nations came together
within the United Nations forum to acknowledge the need for universal human rights
norms.6 However, considering the growing number of states, and the consecutive
institutionalization of cultural relativism, the task of universalizing limitations on
states’ sovereignty to allow the creation of concrete rights for individuals was
gigantesque, and constituted the most important challenge to international law. How
should one reconciliate states’ sovereignty and human rights?

This essential question is reflected in the perpetual debate over reservations to
multilateral treaties, which “has been one of the most controversial subjects in
contemporary international law.” 7 The importance of this issue is demonstrated by
states’ practice, the enormous amount of legal doctrine regarding the subject and by
the time and energy that publicists and scholars spent commenting the possible

5

See Jean Dhommeaux, De L’Universalité du Droit International des Droits de l’Homme : Du Pactum
Feremdum au Pactum Latum, 35 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 399, 400 (1989).
6
See U.N. CHARTER, at pmbl.; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at pmbl.
7
Jose M. Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 RECEUIL DES COURS 95 (1975).
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solutions to this critical question.8 The growing recourse to the use of reservations and
others instruments of qualified consent9 have created disorder in treaty law
understanding, because the various labels attached to the qualifying statements
introduced ambiguity over the effects of those ratification devices.10 The effects of
this terminological ambiguity has however been limited in practice by the adoption of
a rule that does not attach any conclusive value to the label of the statement, which
will only be qualified by reference to its substance and content.11
The important use of those qualifying statements corresponds to the increasing
reliance on multilateral treaties as instruments of international regulation. At the “age
of globalization,” 12 multilateral treaties have become the primary source of
international law in general,13 but also the primary source of human rights law.14
Therefore, the use of reservations, which permits states to “exclude or modify the
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty” 15 on the basis of domestic concerns,16
has been an essential instrument of compromise to the functioning of the international

8

See infra BIBLIOGRAPHY.
For the purpose of this study, understandings, declarations, or interpretative statements will also be
covered by the term “reservation.” On the differences between reservations, understandings,
declarations and interpretative statements, see generally, David Mc Rae, The Legal Effects of
Interpretative Declarations, 1978 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 155 (1978). See also, Derek W. Bowett,
Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 1976-1977 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 67, 67-69
(1977).
10
See Bowett, supra note 9, at 68-69.
11
Reservations are “unilateral statements, however phrased or named, made by a state…”,Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 2(1)(d) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as the Vienna Convention].
12
Hongju Koh, supra note 1, at 295.
13
See I.C.J. Statute, 26 June 1945, U.S.T.S. 993, art. 38. See also, BURNS H. WESTON, RICHARD A.
FALK AND HILARY CHARLESWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, A PROBLEM
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK, 77-79 (West, 3rd ed., American Casebook Series,1997).
14
See Yogesh Tyagi, The Conflict of Law and Policy on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 71
BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 181, 181 (2000).
15
See Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(1)(d).
16
The rationale behind reservations is “multi- dimentional”. However, reservations are usually justified
by domestic law constrains, higher national standards, ideological dissent, political objectives, vital
interests, harmonization of parallel obligations, precautionary measures, economic constrains or
religious fundamentalism. See Tyagi, supra note 14, at 190-201.
9
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legal system.17 In fact, the law of reservations is so fundamental to the modern
practice of international law, that it represents one of the most accurate reflections of
the world order.18

Thus, the law of reservations have been “shaped” by universality and
integrity,19 two opposite forces reflecting two visions of the international legal order:
“a world composed of autonomous states versus an integrated world order.”

20

The

legalization of human rights through treaties have faced the same internal clash, and
the law of reservations is meant to “bridge the gap”

21

between the need for universal

acceptance of the norms codifying human rights standards, and the necessity of a
common understanding of the content of those norms.

As one could say, “reservations to human rights treaties are questionable
[because] they instantly create a feeling of unease. It does not seem proper to exclude
provisions from a treaty obviously meant to protect people, as human rights treaties
are.” 22 Consequently, the study of reservations to human rights treaties is particularly
interesting. It is multi-sided and raises important political questions. Moreover, it is a
technical area, which calls for the reconciliation of traditional treaty law and human
rights law. The appropriate equilibrium between universality and integrity has always

17

See John King Gamble Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State
Practice, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 372, 372 (1980).
18
See Jean Kyongun Koh, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine
Reflects World Vision, 23 HARV. INT’L L. J. 71, 71 (1982).
19
See id.
20
Id.
21
Catherine Logan Piper, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: The Goal of Universality, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 295 (1985).
22
LIESBETH LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, RATIFY AND RUIN?,
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS 38, 3 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995).
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been very fragile, and in the light of modern human rights policies and practices, one
could legitimately questions whether either of these objectives has been attained.
Indeed, the first-sight impression is that “many states, when ratifying, at the same
time ruin the treaty.” 23 However, the majority of states consenting to human rights
conventions with reservations are in a much better position than some others, which
ratify treaties integrally, but never implement them.24

The law of reservations is still a very relevant issue within human rights
studies. The ongoing academic debate over the subject is a good indication of its
significance. However, only very few things remained to be said about this topic. It
has been lengthily studied by the greatest experts in the field and therefore, this article
will hardly bring any revolutionary ideas into the literature. Nevertheless, the
argumentation presented here aims to reveal the inconsistency of the present system
of reservations within the context of human rights treaties, call for a development of a
current trend initiated by human rights treaty bodies and demonstrate the
appropriateness of the emerging law in the light of contemporary theories of
international law. Yet, the scope of this study will be limited to the theoretical and
systemic aspects of the question. The states’ practice regarding reservations will not
be studied in details, nor will the particular context of the various human rights
instruments.

From a human rights advocate perspective, and with an acknowledged accent
of idealism, this paper will explain why, after a too long quest for universal
23

Id.

5

acceptance of human rights norms, the time has come to engage in the next step, and
to promote rules that also protect the essential integrity of international standards for
human rights. The arguments presented will also rely on the idea that international
law could be an efficient instrument for change in human rights practice and could
allow an ever greater respect for human rights in the 21st century.

Part one will summarize the historical evolution of the law of reservations
along the transformation of the world order, and present the general rules and
characteristics of the system of reservations established by the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties.

The second part of the article will analyze the inadequacy of the advantages
offered by the current flexible system, the inefficiency of the corresponding
mechanisms and the failure of the machinery to curtail the pressure of traditional
sovereign states’ influence on the legalization process. It will also reveal the resulting
unreachable integrity of human rights norms, the imperious need to use law as an
instrument of change, and the necessity to give a new impetuous strength to the
international legalization of human rights norms.

The third part of this paper will introduce the existing solutions and alternative
systems that have been proposed to transform the current rules, and present the special
mechanisms which should be used to end incoherent practice with regard to
reservation to human rights treaties. It will also provide examples of supporting
24

See id.
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precedents, evaluate conflicting views and appraise the future evolution of reservation
practice. Finally, it will analyze the applicability of the suggested solution in the light
of state practice, through the example of the United States human rights treaty
policies.

7

CHAPTER 2
THE QUEST FOR UNIVERSALITY

The birth of the first international human rights instruments corresponds to the
emergence of a new world order based on the left-over of second world conflict. The
primary mission of the international community was to establish international
standards affirming the dedication of states to prevent the repetition of the holocaust
atrocities and nazi-regime-like abuses. This “standard-setting” phase

25

was relatively

easy considering the immediate post-war context, and the overall control of western
states on the negotiations process of these instruments. However, in the wake of the
independence movement, the increasing number of state actors and the influence of
diverse political and cultural values on the codification process pushed for the
adoption of flexible mechanisms of treaty making. Indeed the symbolic force of
human rights instruments could only be maintained if supported by widespread
acceptance. Thus, through the evolution of the world order and the transformation of
the reservations rules, one can identify the search for a needed greater malleability of
human rights standards corresponding to the institutionalization of cultural
relativism.26 If the system has evolved through different stages, it is now codified in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which creates a flexible system for
reservations.

25

See Hongju Koh, supra note 1, at 295.
For an overview of the debate on universalism of human rights and cultural relativism, see generally
JACK DONELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989). See also, Robert D.
Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of International Human
Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 527 (2001).
26
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A. Reservations Law and the reflection of the world order.

The doctrine of reservations is highly complex because it includes subtle legal
and political elements. The treaty-making process is used by states to advocate their
vision of what the world order should be: a forum of sovereign states or an integrated
community.27 Thus, the rules governing the validity of reservations to multilateral
treaties reflect the evolution of states’ sovereignty and the different views on the value
of international legislative norms.

1. The Unanimity Rule:

The traditional rule of customary international law governing the validity of
reservations, in the absence of any provision in the treaty itself, established that a
reservation to any multilateral treaty should only be allowed if accepted by all the
parties to the treaty.28 The so-called “unanimity rule”

29

reflected a purely subjective

version of reservation law, consistent with the traditional concept of absolute states’

27

See Catherine Redgwell, Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General
Multilateral Treaties, 1993 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 67 (1993).
28
See Advisory Opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28) [hereinafter Genocide Convention case]. See also
Ruda, supra note 7, at 112.
29
Logan Pipper, supra note 21, at 306.
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sovereignty and the theory of contract.30 If the reservation was objected to, it had to
be withdrawn, or would prevent the reserving state from becoming a party to the
treaty. Thus, the reserving state had its rights and obligations modified to the extent of
the reservation, towards every party to the treaty. The validity of reservations was
dependant on a subjective standard of opposability, by which the uniformity of
obligations was maintained and the integrity of the treaty protected.31 However,
considering that no limit was imposed on the content or scope of the reservation, the
mechanism did not afford protection to the core of the treaty, and the reserving state’s
statement could in fact amount to a real counter-offer.32

The unanimity rule could be described as the ‘good old days’ of reservations
law. At the time, the rule was clear, simple to apply and universally accepted. But it
also mirrored the early to mid-twentieth century nature of the international legal
order, where the absolute sovereignty of states was prevailing; and rules were defined
by the western states, which concentrated the power of rule making at the
international level.33 Thus, the unanimity rule was easy to apply, but especially
because very few states were involved in the treaty making process.

30

See Kyongun Koh, supra note 18, at 75.
See id. at 79.
32
See Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal: A critique of CEDAW’s Reservation regime under
Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 605, 607
(2002).
31
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2. The Pan-American System:

In the 1930’s, the Pan-American Union broke the traditional obedience to the
unanimity rule by creating its own system governing the effects of reservations.34 The
rules created provided another subjective system solely based on the independent
acceptance of the reservation by each party to the treaty,35 and a reserving state could
become a party to the convention, even though other parties objected to their
reservations, as long as one other contracting state had accepted them.36 Thus, the
validity of a reservation was variable and could only be analyzed on a reciprocal
basis. This purely subjective system rendered objections to reservations ineffective
regarding non-objecting states, and therefore “under the piecemeal validity doctrine of
the Pan-American system, only unanimous opposition could make a reservation
completely invalid.” 37

Under this system, the multilateral treaty was only a sort of framework, an
addition of several various and diverse autonomous bilateral relations, vaguely linked
to the same object. This kind of subjective approach to reservations, however, was the
first step towards the recognition of the changing nature of the international system,
and the need for universal acceptance of non-restricted multilateral treaties. Indeed, if
the Pan-American rule clearly protected state’s sovereignty in preventing any
reservation to have effect on an objecting state, it also provided for a large flexibility
33

See Logan Pipper, supra note 21, at 307.
See id. at 308.
35
See Kyongun Koh, supra note 18, at 80.
36
See INTER-AMERICAN JUDICIAL COMITTEE, REPORTS ON THE JUDICIAL EFFECTS OF RESERVATIONS
TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 3 (1955).
34
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and created “possibilities of maximum participation.” 38 This first step towards the
recognition of a change in the international community was important, but very
limited in effect. Indeed, states’ sovereignty was the supreme value sheltered by the
system,39 and wide participation was only possible because there was no real integrity
in the treaty, which consisted of a sum of “sub-treaties”

40

that every party could

transform as it wished. Although the quest for wide participation could give the
illusion of the birth of a world community, the complete absence of treaty integrity
revealed the true nature of the created legal order,41 which preserved the states’
inherent right to make reservations to multilateral conventions, as an instrument of
their sovereignty.42

Thus, the combination of the traditional unanimity rule and the Pan-American
system provided the basis of modern reservation law, which is an institutionalization
of a balancing mechanism, created to attain the right equilibrium in the “spectrum”
between universality and integrity.43 This process of balancing the two competing
forces behind treaty making was clearly illustrated in the International Court of
Justice’s (hereinafter ICJ or World Court) opinion on the reservations to the
Convention on the Crime of Genocide.44

37

Kyongun Koh, supra note 18, at 81.
Ruda, supra note 7, at 121.
39
See Kyongun Koh, supra note 18, at 84.
40
Daniel N. Hylton, Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Inadequate
Framework on Reservations, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 419, 422 (1994).
41
See Kyongun Koh, supra note 18, at 84.
42
See Hylton, supra note 40, at 425.
43
See Logan Pipper, supra note 21, at 309.
38
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3. The Genocide Case:

The problematic effects of the greater use of reservations became apparent in
the 1950’s. The confrontation between the unanimity rule and the flexible PanAmerican system strongly arose within the Sixth Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly which, along with the International Law Commission, was charged
with the determination of the legal consequences of the multiple reservations to the
Genocide Convention and its entry into force.45 Facing “profound divergence of
views” within the Committee, 46 the General Assembly finally adopted a resolution
requesting an advisory opinion of the ICJ.47 The opinion of the ICJ on the legal effects
of reservations to the Genocide Convention constitute a milestone, an “historical
moment” in the evolution of the law of reservation. 48 By abandoning the unanimity
rule, and introducing an “object and purpose”

49

validity test on reservations, the world

court ended the exclusive contractual theory of international treaty making50 and
introduced a dose of integration in a world of sovereign states.

In view of the humanitarian nature of the convention,51 the court considered
that the traditional subjective approach regarding the validity of reservations was not
adapted anymore.52 Indeed, the Genocide Convention, as other human rights treaties,

44

See Genocide Convention case, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
See Redgwell, supra note 27, at 249.
46
See id. See also, Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations, 46 AM. J. INT’L L.
483 (1952).
47
G.A. Res. 478, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 74, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.125 (1950).
48
See Kyongun Koh, supra note 18, at 85.
49
Genocide Convention case, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28), at 24.
50
See Redgwell, supra note 27, at 250.
51
See Genocide Convention case, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28), at 22.
52
See id.
45
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had a raison d’être of its own: “the accomplishment of those high purposes”
convention that constituted the “common interest”

54

53

of the

of the contracting parties. Thus,

the ICJ concluded that the convention was not characterized by “individual
advantages or disadvantages to states, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual
balance between rights and duties” 55 and that the classic subjective test of
acceptability was not sufficient to ensure the validity of reservations to the Genocide
Convention. Therefore, it introduced the now famous “compatibility test,” which
permits a reserving state to become a party to a treaty, notwithstanding objections by
other parties, as long as the reservation was “compatible with the object and purpose
of the convention.” 56
The court based its opinion on the dual nature of “humanitarian” and
“civilizing” 57 conventions, created for universal participation in the formation of
international minimum standards for individuals’ rights and freedoms. On one hand,
the goal of universal participation, necessary to the norm-creating objective of the
convention,58 rendered the unanimity rule totally “inconceivable,”

59

as it would lead

to possible exclusion of certain reserving states for negligible reasons.60 On the other
hand, the flexible system inspired by the Pan-American rule could easily guide to the
“sacrifice of the very object of the Convention in favor of a vain desire to secure as
many participants as possible,” 61 what was then considered as “even less” possible.

53

Id. at 23.
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 22.
58
See Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human
Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 277, 289 (1999).
59
See Redgwell, supra note 27, at 251.
60
See Genocide Convention case, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28), at 24.
61
Id.
54
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62

The new compatibility test combined enough flexibility to maintain the freedom of
states to enter reservations to treaties, and a test based on the object and purpose of
the treaty as a limit safeguarding the integrity of the convention. However, the
vocabulary used by the Court63 seems to suggest that the preservation of the integrity
of the treaty was the superior function assigned to the compatibility test.64 The failure
to assert an appropriate mechanism to define the compatibility test would nevertheless
render this superior goal unachievable.

In sum, while searching for the reconciliation between universal acceptance
and treaty integrity, the ICJ created a presumption favoring ratification and wide
participation to the treaty but also instituted an objective test of compatibility
designed to protect the integrity of the treaty on the basis of its object and purpose.
This experimentation in mixing subjective and objective elements65 to regulate the use
of reservations lead to various imperfections and gave rise to many criticisms of what
then resembled to a judicial revolution in the area of reservations law.
First, notwithstanding the special attention that the Court attached to the
traditional rule of state consent;66 a state could now only invalidate the reservation of
another party by reference to an external and objective standard. This newly
established objective standard constituted a rather remarkable intrusion on the states’
sovereignty.67 This significant departure from the traditional practice was severely

62

Id.
“Even less”, id.
64
Id. See also Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservation Regime and The Convention on
Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 281, 293 (1991).
65
See Kyongun Koh, supra note 18, at 88.
66
See Genocide Convention case, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28), at 27.
67
See Kyongun Koh, supra note 18, at 87.
63
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criticized by the minority of the court as an assault on the sovereignty of states and on
the sacrosanct rule of state consent.68
Moreover, the “object and purpose” test was very fragile and ambiguous in
practice. Indeed, objecting parties could use the same standard, while possibly
referring to different or even conflicting views over the object and purpose of the
treaty.69 This theoretical objective standard could in fact lead to the disintegration of
the treaty’s integrity and transform it into a “fragmented commitment, interpreted in
various inconsistent ways by frustrated parties.” 70
Additionally, the suggested recourse to special agreements for dispute
settlements over the object and purpose definition was clearly unsatisfactory,
considering the general reluctance of states regarding these mechanisms.71 The legal
uncertainty resulting from the subjective application of an objective standard
demonstrated the limit of the rule created by the ICJ, which was also attacked as
lacking legal basis.72 Immediately, dissenters73 and scholars74 predicted the great
practical difficulty to apply the compatibility rule in the absence of an objective
arbitrary system.

Although the opinion of the world court reflected the necessity of a flexible
adaptation of the treaty making process in the light of the expansion of the post-war
international community, the increasing use of multilateral treaties, and the quest for
widespread acceptance of emerging human rights standards; it also demonstrated the
68

See Genocide Convention case, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28), at 46 (Joint Dissenting Opinion).
See Kyongun Koh, supra note 19, at 87.
70
Id. at 88.
71
See Genocide Convention case, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28), at 45 (Joint Dissenting Opinion).
72
See id.
69
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limit of the quest for universal constraint on states’ sovereignty. The consequences of
the decision were also to be limited by the concomitant work on treaty law produced
by the International Law Commission (hereinafter the ILC). However, the Genocide
Opinion of the ICJ remains a “catalytic event initiating the subsequent development in
the law of reservations.” 75

4. The International Law Commission Project.

The importance of the ICJ opinion was also accentuated by the fact that it
preceded, and strongly influenced, the publication of the work of the ILC on the
codification of treaty law.76 Indeed, the majority of the Commission was supporting
the maintenance of the traditional unanimity rule,77 and arguing for its codification as
a general rule of international law on reservations.78 However, in its opinion, the ICJ
had rightfully demonstrated the need for a more reasonable approach of the issue, and
the ILC was therefore forced to consider the necessity to nuance its absolute
protection of the integrity of treaties. The ILC finally admitted the importance of
universality in the changing international community, and recognized that a pure
contractual theory was no more applicable to general multilateral treaties.

73

See id.
See Redgwell, supra note 27, at 252.
75
Id. at 313.
76
See First Report on the Law of Treaties of the International Law Commission, 1962 Y. B. INT’L L.
COMM’N 65, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/144 [hereinafter ILC Report I].
77
See Redgwell, supra note 27, at 253.
78
See Kyongun Koh, supra note 18, at 92.
74
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Thus, the articles drafted by the Commission integrated the compatibility test
created by the ICJ, but subjected it to the “fundamental principle” of state consent.

79

Indeed, the purpose and object of the treaty was only taken into consideration when
formulating a reservation.80 The compatibility test was the most favored, but not the
only, ground for objecting to a reservation.81 The draft project also introduced the
concept of tacit acceptance,82 which created a de facto presumption for acceptance for
reservations. A limited period of time was available to states to register their
objections against reservations.83 After this period, reservations were reputed to be
implicitly accepted. This technique of standardization of intent was conditioning
states’ ability to object and made the form, rather than the substance, the “key
element” of the reservations procedure.

84

Objections to a reservation rendered the treaty inapplicable between the two
parties.85 Therefore, a conditionally accepted treaty would only be in force between
the reserving states and those accepting the reservations.86 This compromise was the
result of a strong opposition between integrality and universality advocates within the
ILC.87 While acknowledging the need for flexibility, some feared that the protection
of states’ interests and sovereignty would curtail the benefit of the international
community in the preservation of the integrity of the treaty.88 According to them,
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safeguards were necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the treaty.89 Their
opponents argued that a certain margin of manoeuvre should be left to the states to
allow them to protect their individual particularities by using reservations.90 The
flexibility would enhance the universal adherence to the treaty, which was better
adapted to the modern nature of the international legal order.91 However, the treaty
would “remain the master agreement providing guidance for the international
community.” 92 Clearly, universality then became the prime objective of the law of
reservations, which functioned on a largely subjective basis.93 This was the result of
the increasing diversity among states participating to the creation of international
norms. Notwithstanding the introduction of certain constrains on states’ will, the
system as a whole was largely prioritizing states’ sovereignty over the interest of the
international community, and subsequently failed to create a functioning balance.94

If the “flexible system”

95

created by the ILC never came into force, the ILC

Report had nevertheless confirmed the movement instituted by the ICJ in its Genocide
case, and had certainly influenced the drafters of the Vienna Convention to a great
extent.96
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B. The Vienna Convention System.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is one of the most achieved
successes of the international law making process. It was the result of “twenty years
of research, deliberations and negotiations” 97 and provided the codification of existing
rules of international customary law governing the creation, effects and interpretation
of international agreements.98 It was signed on May 23, 1969 at the Vienna
Conference on the Law of Treaties, and entered into force for 35 countries on January
27, 1980. As of 2000, 90 states are party to it,99 and its legal force goes beyond its
nature,100 as most states of the world, even though there are not parties to it, are
nowadays admitting the binding power of the Convention.101
Part Two, Section Two of the Vienna Convention deals with the rules on
reservations, and has become the most elaborate system of reservations in
international law.102 It also constitutes the lex generalis on reservations.103 Article 19
deals with the formulation of reservations, article 20 with acceptance of and
objections to reservations, article 21 with the legal effects of reservations and
objections, article 22 provides the rules for the withdrawal of reservations and
objections, and finally, article 23 states the procedural rules concerning
97
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reservations.104 The analysis presented here will focus on articles 19, 20 and 21,
which represent the institutionalization of the revolutionary rule enunciated by the ICJ
in the Genocide case. However, this rule is not considered as revolutionary
anymore,105 and clearly represents the positive law, as applied by the most important
courts106 at the international level and followed by all “prudent” states.

107

Yet, we will

see that the codification of accepted rules does not guarantee a perfect system.

1. The Rules: a flexible system.

i. Article 19, the object and purpose test codified.
Article 19 deals with the admissibility, the permissibility of reservations. The
object and purpose test as codified in article 19 of the Vienna Convention is only a
safety valve, a last resort solution. It is a default rule, a “safety net,”

108

which enters

into effect when the treaty itself does not provide any information on its reservations
regime.109 First, one should notice than the vocabulary used by the drafters suggests a
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general positive presumption for reservations.110 This presumption can be reversed by
specific provisions of the treaty providing for the prohibition of the reservation
submitted,111 or by an implicit prohibition resulting from the absence of the
reservation in question within a specific authorization clause, listing authorized
reservations.112 Thus, the default rule of article 19(c) has a broad scope of application
and covers every other treaty.113 Indeed, international agreements are rarely providing
dispositions for reservations,114 which are always difficult to negotiate. Moreover,
ambiguity usually satisfies all the parties.115 However, the application of article 19(c)
is limited to the formulation of reservations,116 and the object and purpose test is not
mentioned in the objections article. In this respect, the rule differs from the ICJ
opinion,117 and has created a strong controversy regarding the articulation between the
permissibility and the opposability of a reservation.118

A state can enter a reservation when it signs, ratifies, accepts, approves or
accedes to a treaty if the latter does not prohibit such a reservation. It cannot do so if
the Treaty does not allow it specifically while listing possible reservations, or in any
other cases if the reservation is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty.119
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This objective standard of the “object and purpose” of the treaty is a limit on
the admissibility of a reservation. The compatibility with the core of the treaty120
reflect the importance attached by the Vienna Convention drafters, like the judges of
the world court, to the integrity of the treaty. The “object” and the “purpose” of the
treaty, although quite unclear in nature,121 constitute the legal identity of each treaty
and have to be interpreted as such.122 Indeed, when signing a treaty, states are
presumed to endorse its goal(s),123 and consideration is due to state’s consent. Thus,
the “object and purpose” test could appear as an objective and effective standard to
protect the integrity of the treaty against attacks by extended reservations.

ii. Article 20, acceptance and objections.
“Article 20.4 124 comprises the basic rules concerning reservations: namely the
consequences of reservations as well as the consequences of objections. It is basically
this provision that lays down the pattern of future treaty relations.” 125 When a state
enters a reservation to a treaty while expressing its consent to be bound, it can only
become a party to the treaty if another party to the treaty accepts its reservation.126
However, a unique acceptance suffices to give legal effect to the reservation.127 Thus,
acceptance of reservations functions on a purely bilateral manner, and establishes
120
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treaty relations on a reciprocal basis.128 The multilateral treaty will “break down” and
enter into force on a bilateral basis as modified by the acceptance or the rejection of
reservations.129 This mechanism constitutes a flexible system that certainly
encourages reservations.130 The orientation of the Vienna Convention’s rules towards
greater flexibility is confirmed by the objections system.
Indeed, objections themselves do not preclude the entry into force of the
treaty between the reserving and the objecting states.131 The objecting state bears the
“burden”

132

to reverse the new presumption133 favoring the maintenance of treaty

relations, and shall “definitively express”

134

that it opposes the entry into force of the

treaty with the reserving state. Some have argued that this presumption favoring
universal acceptance of treaties was a rule of customary law, preexisting to its
codification in the Vienna Convention.135 In any case, the rule seems coherent with
the general flexibility of the system, and fit within the search for greater participation
to the treaty, as recommended by international practice.136 One should notice that
objections are attached very little effect, unless the objecting state has clearly stated
otherwise. Opinions differ as to whether the objecting state has an obligation to
express its motives for objecting and precluding the entry into force of the treaty.
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However, it is certain that the entry into force will only be precluded if the intention
of the objecting state is “incontestable.”

137

The flexibility regarding the acceptance of reservations is also emphasized by
article 20.5 which provide that “unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is
considered to have been accepted by a state if it shall have raised no objection to the
reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified, or by the
date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.”
This other presumption of consent reinforces the flexibility of the system, and
clarifies the issue of entry into force of the treaty for the reserving state.138 Like in the
ILC project, the form rather than the substance is central to the Vienna convention
system.139

iii. Article 21, the legal effects of reservations on treaty relations.
Reciprocity is the basic element characterizing article 21, and the effects of
reservations.140 Indeed, reservations modify the treaty relationship between the
reserving and accepting states in both ways. The provision of the treaty to which the
reservation relates is modified for the reserving state “to the extent of the
reservation,” 141 and “to the same extent for [the] other party.”

142

The effect is limited

to a reciprocal degree, because it “does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the
other parties to the treaty inter se.” 143 The aggregate effect of those provisions is to
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give a limited effect to reservations, which, in principle, have to be interpreted
restrictively.144
Articles 21.3 has deprived objections not precluding the entry into force of the
treaty of any legal effect and rendered “the difference between acceptance and
objection […] rather obscure.”

145

Indeed, “when a state objecting to a reservation has

not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving state, the
provisions to which the reservation relates does not apply as between the two states to
the extent of the reservation.” 146 Thus, the objected reservation has the same effect
than the accepted one: the non-application of the related provision, to the extent of the
reservation, between the two parties. Some argue that the objection still has some
effect as political statement,147 or as an a priori objection to the possible creation of a
customary rule.148 Nevertheless, the confusion remains.

The preceding remarks demonstrate that the rules for reservations created by
the Vienna Convention are a mixture of different elements offering enough flexibility
to protect the sovereign will of states, and maintaining several presumptions in favor
of the treaty. However, the combination of paradoxical elements representing the two
opposite driving forces of treaty law also created a certain amount of legal uncertainty
regarding the interpretation and the meaning of the rules presented below.
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2. The debate: Permissibility v. Opposability.

We have already noticed that the “object and purpose” test was mentioned as
operating for the formulation of reservations, but was not cited as a criterion for
objection.149 Thus it is unclear what is the role of the test in relation with
permissibility and opposability, and two categories of scholars are opposing their
interpretations.150
For some, the incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty vitiates
the reservation, which is “immediately and incurably invalid.”
reservation is based on a “one-tier test”

152

151

The validity of a

which defines the permissibility of a

reservation on the basis of the object and purpose of the treaty. According to this
view, the acceptance by other parties “is a matter of policy”

153

and does not play any

role in the validity of the reservation, because there would be a contradiction in
signing a treaty and accepting a reservation that violates its object and purpose.154
This interpretation represents an objective system based on treaty interpretation155 and
implies that article 19 defines the permissibility of a reservation, while article 20
defines its opposability.156 This view is justified by the fact that the acceptance of an
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impermissible reservation would render the compatibility test useless,157 what would
be contrary to the principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of treaties.158
However, considering the lack of any independent adjudication mechanism in the
Vienna Convention, the objective standard cannot be used “objectively.” Thus, states
make the determination of the permissibility subjectively, and the practicability of a
one-tier test is therefore questionable.
For others, “the validity of reservations depends solely on the acceptance of
the reservation by another contracting state.” 159 Consequently, the compatibility test
would only play an inspirational role160 but would have no legal effect.161 This view is
supported by the absence of the compatibility test in article 20, which set forth the
conditions for objections. One could easily argue that the two-tier test is justified by
the fact that the convention does not “expressly preclude the making of objections to
reservations other than on the grounds of incompatibility.” 162 Under this test, states
can object to a reservation on the basis of impermissibility, but also on the basis of
political considerations. Within the ‘opposability school’ views differ on whether it is
possible to object to an impermissible reservation.163 Judge Ruda argues that states
might have political interests in accepting an impermissible reservation, and that the
text of the convention does not prevent them to do so.164 Under this view,
permissibility is only a preliminary issue. Validity includes more: acceptability.165
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The text of the Vienna Convention is of little help to determine who is right.
The compatibility test created by the convention is treated as a “unaffiliated
metaphysical concept” 166 and the objectivity sought by article 19(c) seems
inapplicable, considering that no corresponding judicial mechanism is created, and
that only states are able to review the permissibility of a reservation on the basis of a
subjective definition of the object and purpose of the treaty.167 It is argued that this
omission of the Vienna Convention drafters was deliberate168 and one should
therefore conclude that, in practice, states retain the power to determine the validity of
a reservation, by defining its compatibility in a subjective manner and consecutively
establish its opposability. The flexible system is therefore very convenient for states
and includes many advantages regarding international rule making in many areas.
However, with respect to human rights agreements, the system is obsolete and
inadequate. As Professor (and Special Rapporteur) Pellet put it, “although the Vienna
regime generally worked satisfactorily, the ongoing and perhaps insoluble doctrinal
‘quarrel’ between the opposability school and the permissibility school showed that
there were ambiguities and uncertainties with regard to reservations that the regime
could not remove.” 169
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CHAPTER 3
THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE FLEXIBLE SYSTEM.

The Vienna Convention has created a very malleable treaty making system,
favoring the establishment of treaty relations through a general presumption
supporting states’ abilities to enter reservations; 170 a bilateral system of reservations
acceptance;171 and a rule of tacit consent.172 This very elaborate system is the result of
previous experiences and reflects the recent need of the international society for
greater flexibility.173 These norms of reservations law have obtained a certain success
since their creation and allowed many multilateral treaties to gain a large acceptance
rate, something inconceivable under the reign of the unanimity rule.

However, this part will demonstrate that the advantages of the Vienna
Convention system are not benefiting the human rights regime anymore. Indeed, the
perpetual quest for universal acceptance of human rights treaties through loose
reservations mechanisms has hidden the overwhelming control of sovereign states
over international standards setting, and the inaccessibility of coherence and integrity
in many areas. Considering the unique nature of human rights conventions, it appears
that the present system of reservations is inadequate for legislative treaty making, and
that there is a strong need to change reservations mechanisms with respect to human
rights law.
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A. Inadequate Flexibility.

1. “A problem of tools.”

174

i. The contractual nature of treaty law.
A treaty can be defined as an agreement whereby two or more states establish,
or seek to establish, a relationship governed by international law between them.175
states have always used treaties to regulate their mutual relationships. The first
treaties were designed on the model of private contracts, as kings exercising property
rights over their kingdoms governed most nations. Treaties were establishing rights
and obligations on a subjective basis, with reference to rules of private law and
customs. The traditional rules of contract evolved and were adapted to the changing
practice. States acquired independent legal entity and developed their commercial
relations with other nations.
With the growing of the international community, the appearance of new
states, the development of travel and communication technologies, interdependence
and multilateral relations have increased rapidly.176 The traditional contractual
approach to treaty between states was therefore obsolete and needed to be adapted.
The forms of treaty making were changed to reflect the structural evolution of the
international community.177 However, the ‘horizontal expansion’ of the international
community did not change the fundamental methods of setting rules at the
173
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international level. Indeed, although the scope and the number of treaties grew, the
subjects and beneficiaries of the instruments remained the same: sovereign states.
Consequently, states continued to use contractual techniques to negotiate among each
other, because it was the best mean to protect their sovereignty. As states can only be
bound by what they consent to, contractual methods were the best safeguards of
sovereignty in the international ruling system. Thus, they adapted treaties rules to
transform multilateral agreements into “a bundle of bilateral treaties.”

178

In this respect, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is a success. It
institutes states’ consent as a supreme value, and reciprocity as an absolute instrument
of international regulation.179 The rules on reservations are a perfect reflection of this
characteristic. As we have seen, the system of acceptance of reservations practically
breaks any multilateral agreement into a sum of bilateral relations.180 Changes to the
treaty by mean of reservations will only have reciprocal effects. This logic is justified
by the fact that reciprocity is a fundamental element of the law of treaties, which
stabilizes relations and ensures equilibrium between the parties.181 Reciprocity seems
absolutely essential to treaty law, since the international legal order still lacks a
central authority182 and states remains the masters of the functioning system. Through
the bargaining process of treaty making, they control the level of their commitments,
in the light of the costs and benefits of the resulting agreement.
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When dealing with a formulated reservation, states will proceed the same way:
what are the benefits and the costs of accepting the reservation? Of rejecting it? This
practice is logical when states’ interests, rights and obligations are the object of the
reservation. However, when dealing with human rights treaties, this reciprocal
approach is not adapted because then, “states do not have an interest of their own;
they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of
those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the convention. Consequently, in a
convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to
states, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and
duties.” 183

ii. The aspirational nature of human rights law.
The traditional contractual nature of international law has been influenced by
the vertical transformation within the international community. The emergence of
international institutions and organizations as new actors of international law has
brought the law making process to a more cooperative trend.184 This move from
reciprocity to cooperation185 gave birth to more law-making treaties,186 such as the
Vienna Convention, and more legislative treaties, such as the Genocide Convention
and other human rights instruments. These legislative treaties are distinguished from
contractual agreements because they deal with general obligations of objective
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nature187 and the interests of the international community as a whole, not with the
“reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting states.”

188

Human rights law is mainly constituted by these legislative treaties, which
provide rights for individuals against their own or other states.189 Theoretically,
custom would have been the most adapted tool to develop human rights law, which
consists in imposing universal constraints on states’ sovereignty. However, the length
of the custom making process, its uncertainty and fuzziness, naturally pushed the
human rights movement into the classical technique of “ treatyfication.” 190 However,
treaties had always been used by states to protect their interests. They were
instruments of states, not of individuals. In human rights treaties, states remain the
subject of the agreements, but are not the beneficiaries anymore. Individuals are the
recipients of duties imposed on states.191 States are commonly bound to achieve a
common goal, but have no interest of their own. Treaty law was adapted to the
creation of mutual and reciprocal obligations, but not to the formation of universal
and objective obligations.192 Therefore, the rule governing the formation of treaties
had to be transformed to provide enough flexibility to be applicable to different kind
of treaties: contractual, constitutional, and legislative. This was a technical challenge
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for the Vienna Convention,193 which was to provide a uniform set of rules, but be
sufficiently flexible to be applied universally and to various kinds of treaties,
including human rights conventions. Indeed, a separate system of treaty rules for
human rights convention was undesirable,194 as it would create confusion,195 possible
conflicts, and isolate the human rights regime from international law.196

The technical problems between treaty law and human rights law also resulted
from a more profound divergence. On the one hand, treaty law is based on a
fundamentally static approach, codifying solidly rooted traditional tools of consensual
rule making. On the other hand, human rights law is subject to a dynamic process
resulting from its aspirational nature.197 Therefore, “serious conceptual problems arise
when one attempts to apply traditional rules to human rights treaties.” 198 Indeed,
human rights conventions are in constant evolution. They are “living instrument[s]” 199
aimed at the promotion of individuals’ rights and freedoms. This primary difference
with the static character of treaty law created a need for a technical conciliation,
because if “the traditional law of treaties is not the best possible tool [for the
development of human rights] unfortunately it is the only available one.” 200 In its
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Genocide Opinion, the ICJ has fulfilled this technical task of reconciliation between
treaty law and human rights law. In creating the object and purpose test to ensure the
validity of reservations, the world court ensured that the aspirational nature of human
rights treaties would limit the effects of reservations. However, to be efficient and
ensure the harmonization of treaty and human rights law, the test would have to be
enforced and not remain a toothless watchdog.

2. The sabotage of the object and purpose test.

i. Objective standard, subjective mechanism.
According to the ICJ, the flexibility needed to obtain universal adherence
should be balanced with the essential need for integrity in legislative treaties.201 The
object and purpose test was a technical device incorporating some objectivity in a
system dominated by subjectivity and reciprocity. Many states contested the creation
of the test as a revolutionary threat on their sovereignty, which was now subject to an
objective limitation mechanism.202 It is unquestionable that the creation of such a
constraint on states’ sovereignty could only result from the decision of an
independent, supranational body. On their own, and within the traditional context of
international negotiations, states would not have set up a norm that creates an
obligation for all, and a benefit for none. That is why human rights treaties are
traditionally negotiated under the auspices of international or regional organizations,
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which are able to gather states and push them to go beyond their individual interest, to
attain a superior and common objective.203
Once the object and purpose test was created, states had to deal with it. In the
light of the structural changes of the international community, its rejection was
impossible: it was a “reasonable” test.

204

The test was therefore included in the

Vienna Convention.205 However, states retained their control over the negotiations of
the Vienna Convention, and were able to shape the rules of treaty law according to
their interests. Thus, they codified the objective mechanism in article 19, but
voluntarily omitted206 an appropriate mechanism to ensure that the compatibility test
would function. Indeed, article 20 implies that states are charged with the
implementation of the objective standard. One could reasonably question the logic207
of having an objective standard implemented subjectively.208 This legal trick ensured
states that the constraint on their sovereignty would be meaningless in practice, as
they would be able to appreciate the objective element freely.209 The Vienna
Convention giving no definition of the test, and failing to install an objective
mechanism to define it, states were left with the freedom to construe the object and
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purpose of the treaty according to their interest.210 Thus, the validity of reservation is
entirely dependant on states’ will 211 which decide whether or not another parties’
reservations are compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.212 As predicted
by the ILC, the test became really impracticable,213 and was transformed from an
objective safeguard into a “mere doctrinal assertion.”

214

Moreover, since states are able to assess subjectively the compatibility test,
there is nothing to ensure the absence of “political or extralegal motives”

215

interfering with this legal matter. Additionally, the risk of perverting a legal
mechanism into a diplomatic game is reinforced by the tacit consent rule of article 21
of the Vienna Convention. Indeed, considering that an objecting state carries the
burden of an explicit objection to an incompatible reservation,216 its objective reasons
to oppose an incompatible reservation could easily be vitiated by extralegal
considerations. First of all, the twelve-month time limit is a rather short one.217 In
practice, many objections have been disqualified as such, because communicated after
the twelve-month limit.218 Objecting to a reservation within twelve months implies the
administrative capacity and the technical resources to do so, and it is doubtful that all
states possess them.219 Additionally, economic and geo-strategic considerations can
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influence states to refrain from objecting to a reservation formulated by others.220
Objection to a reservation is always considered as a somewhat unfriendly act221 and
could easily provoke a “political backlash.”

222

Indeed, some states are protected

against objections to their reservations by their economic power or political
influence.223 Furthermore, considering that “the pressure an objection can exert to
withdraw a reservation is now negligible, since the reserving state can still remain a
party to the treaty and the treaty may even enter into force between the reserving and
the objecting states,” 224 there is indeed very little incentive for a state party to enforce
the objective compatibility test. Consequently, it is not surprising that in practice,
states adopt a “precautionary approach.”

225

Tacit acceptance of reservations has

become a de facto rule, and explicit acceptance is an exception.226
In sum, the Vienna Convention and its extra-flexibility favoring treaty
relations and universal participation has sabotaged the objectivity, and therefore the
efficiency, of the compatibility test created by the Genocide case. In the context of
human rights, this has led to problematic consequences and impaired the force of
human rights law.
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ii. Unreachable standards.
The integrity of human rights treaties is essential to their existence. The ICJ
has rightly explained that the goal of integrity should not be sacrificed for the sake of
universality.227 Both objectives are part of the aspirational nature of human rights
treaties, but as explained by the world court, integrity is somehow more essential to
human rights treaties that universality.228 This natural preeminence of integrity over
universality is due to the legislative/codifying purpose of human rights conventions.
They are aspirational in the sense that they call for a change in the practice of states,
and are aimed at the transformation of the lex feranda into lex lata.229 For this
purpose, both universality and integrity are needed. The codification is only worthy if
it has a certain degree of horizontal application; wide acceptance is therefore needed.
But what is the relevance of a great participation to an empty code? The universality
of a human rights convention is therefore dependant on its integrity.

Reservations to human rights treaties are highly valuable in their contribution
to the goal of universality. This value is nevertheless conditioned to their limitation
and to the respect for the object and purpose of the treaty. Indeed, a large and
uncontrolled admissibility of reservations tend to ruin the legal uniformity that
legislative treaties are seeking to establish.230 Then, human rights conventions would
just become additional documents in a collection of treaties, without any positive
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legal value.231 As Ryan Goodman put it, “concerns to maintain the core of an
agreement assume special significance in the case of human rights treaties. In such
contexts, the very purpose of the multilateral regime is to codify and maintain a
minimum level of global standards. Allowing states to join the treaty with
incompatible reservations would repudiate or downgrade its normative, or standardsetting base. This result, of course, cannot be controlled by individual state objections,
because State O’s objections apply only to the relationship between itself and State R.
Accordingly, State O cannot prevent the incompatible reservations from affecting the
constitutive elements of the treaty.” 232

It is also argued that reservations provide legal certainty233 over the definition
and the scope of human rights treaties dispositions, regularly vaguely formulated.234
This additive legal security is very precious in the context of codification treaties.
However, this certainty only emerges at a bilateral level. Through the reciprocal
acceptance/objections game, states are allowed to “pick and choose”

235

their

obligations, defining the scope of the human rights standards. If their proposal is
accepted, or rather not objected to, then the standard is defined precisely, with respect
to the non-objecting state. However, “the concept of reciprocity is inapplicable to
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legislative situations.” 236 In fact, the treaty would become a list of bilateral
commitments, a framework of standards à géomètrie variable and would be deprived
of any uniformity.237 It would remain an empty shell.

Some have claimed that the negative effect of reservations to human rights and
legislative treaties is exaggerated.238 The integrity of such a treaty can only be
affected by important and numerous reservations. Apparently, a “macroscopic view”
demonstrates that this is not the case in practice.239 Therefore, it seems justified to put
in perspective the obstructive effect of reservations on the creation of uniform
international standards.240 Still, reservations seem to have a more rampant
consequence on human rights law. By breaking down a uniform international
codification into a sum of bilateral standards, the liberal use of reservations under the
Vienna Convention has rendered codification ineffective and legislative treaties
meaningless.241 The flowering and multiplication of human rights agreements in the
recent decades is also a sign of their weakness. Human rights law is searching
authority in the accumulation of norms, since the natural authority of a legislative
instrument is absent from most human rights treaties, which are vitiated by

236

Clark, supra note 64, at 318. The United Nations Human Rights Committee stated that “the
principle of inter-state reciprocity has no place” in human rights treaties. General Comment 24, supra
note 109, at para. 17. See also, Tyagi, supra note 14, at 186: “The difficulty is essentially, that the
concept of human rights is not based on the idea of reciprocity.”
237
Speaking about the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Economic and
Social Rights Professor Jenks said that because of reservations and their indeterminate validity “there is
a real danger that the Covenants may disintegrate into a series of bilateral agreements expressed in two
common instruments but binding different degrees between different parties,” in Tyagi, supra note 14,
at 206.
238
See generally Gamble supra note 17. See also IMBERT, supra note 110, at 359.
239
See Gamble, supra note 17, at 392.
240
See Teboul, supra note 121, at 713-714.
241
See Clark, supra note 64, at 317: “The function of legislative treaties is to contribute to world order
by providing regulation and consistency in specific area. If derogations from such treaties are numerous
[…] this function is impaired.”

42

incompatible reservations. The danger is that reservations would transform legislative
treaties into “ des monstres juridiques qui ne sont ni des traités, ni des lois,” 242 and
weakens the general authority of international law. It could also eventually confine
human rights law into declarative instruments deprived of legal force.

It appears that the system of the Vienna Convention interchanged the primacy
of integrity over universality that resulted from the ICJ genuine compatibility test.
Nevertheless, the universality obtained by the over flexible system appears of rather
limited benefit. The Vienna Convention reservation regime has perverted the relation
between integrity and universality, and it may be the time to restore the process.

B. Limited Universality.

1. The myth of universal acceptance.

i. The cost of flexibility.
A flexible reservation regime is aimed to maximize states’ participation, and
thus increase the authoritative and symbolic force of the treaty.243 A treaty signed by
an extended majority of countries will be more likely to be obeyed, and joined by
others eventually. Developing adherence to international standards increases their
legitimacy and demonstrates their universal applicability. However, universal
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participation to multilateral treaties is increasingly difficult to achieve, due to the
importance of political and cultural diversity among states,244 and to the ever-greater
scope of international agreements.245 The law of reservation had to evolve to its
current state to allow for a maximum level of flexibility, permitting states to
individually arrange their obligations under the treaty and prevent conflict with their
cultural, legal or political identity or interests. This need for flexibility and
universality is particularly strong with respect to human rights treaties, which are at
the junction of states’ sovereignty and the development of universal values.
Thus, reservations have provided “means for states to overcome minor
difficulties in joining a treaty and lead to a wider acceptance of the treaty’s rule.” 246
Reservations have been especially necessary to the development of international
human rights law, which has developed to a substantive set of norms with a certain
symbolic and consensual force. The rules of the Vienna Convention seems to provide
for a maximum flexible use of reservations by states which finally control their
validity through permissibility247 and opposability.248 This process reflects the
sacrosanct principle that states can only be bound by their consent.249 Hence, states
can control the level of their commitment and undertake obligations that are in
conformity with their interests or identity. In the same time, the States’ participation
to the treaty ensures a greater authority to the treaty and reinforces its binding
character at the global level. Moreover, although reserving States are not obliged to
comply with every obligations of the treaty, they remain within the scope of the
244
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treaty, and this membership “will ensure supervision, and encourages the
improvement of the domestic human rights situation.” 250 In sum, the idea that human
rights are universal must be reflected by global adherence to human rights treaties,
and due to the complex nature of the international society, the greatest adherence is
ensured by a system allowing flexible use of reservations.

However, commentators have pointed out that this somehow logical
conclusion “lacks statistical confirmation,”

251

and that the positive effect of a flexible

reservation system has certainly been overestimated.252 For instance, the International
Covenant on Political and Civil Rights253 has applied the flexible system of the
Vienna Convention254 which resulted in only 100 ratifications of the treaty, including
44 reservations.255 Considering that the world counts nowadays almost 200 States,
one should definitely put the influence of reservations to treaty participation in
perspective. There is no doubt that reservations facilitate States’ participation to
multilateral treaties, and especially human rights treaties, in which sovereign, cultural
and political attributes are at stake. However, it is quixotic to pretend that absolute
universal participation to international human rights agreements will be obtained on
the basis of a maximum flexible use of reservations. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
reconsider the necessity of an absolute flexibility when dealing with reservations to
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human rights treaties. The goal of universality is legitimate and initiatives that
promote it should be welcomed. Nonetheless, if “reservations are a necessary price for
universal participation” 256 to human rights treaties, one should keep in mind that
universality of human rights is very relative, and that therefore, the reservation-price
of universal participation should also be reconsidered.

ii. Which Universality?
The universality of human rights is a broad and difficult question.257 This
issue is multi-sided, largely rooted in philosophical, religious and moral ideas.258
Therefore, one should immediately reckon than universality of human rights is
unlikely to be achieved through the limited scope of legal instruments, and even less
through the sole basis of treaty law.
It is unquestionable that universal participation to human rights treaties would
contribute to the overall development of the universality of human rights. However,
the confusion between “formal” and “substantial” universality is easy.

259

Universal

adherence to human rights treaties is nor synonymous of universal respect for human
rights, neither of the universality of human rights. Indeed, “global adherence alone is
a rather meager form of universality.” 260 Therefore, the benefit of the quest for
universality through the flexible use of reservations is relative. It should not be an
absolute or perpetual quest, because it is very doubtful that an absolute universal
acceptance of human rights treaty will ever be obtained anyway. As a matter of legal
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doctrine, universality does not fit in international agreements: “the method suitable for
the creation of universally valid and integrally binding law would be customary
international law.” 261 Thus, the absolute universality, which is sought through the
flexible use of reservation, seems unreachable. If one admits that substantial
universality is unreachable, that formal universality is idealistic and of limited
interest, one should also questions the justification of a treaty law system which has
made universality its supreme and ultimate objective, at the cost of the integrity of the
treaty.

2. A (too) short-term vision.

i. The cost of universality.
In a famous statistical study,262 Gamble has tried to demonstrate that a liberal
use of reservations was also justified by their relatively benign consequence in
practice. In a very detailed and well supported manner, Gamble suggests that
“reservations may not be too serious of a problem; [because] most are of fairly minor
nature.” 263 However, this conclusion might be totally different when one looks at it in
the context of human rights conventions.264 In the context of human rights, the
struggle of treaty law for an adequate balance between universality and integrity
might not be the same than in the context of general multilateral treaties. Indeed, in
the context of human rights, universality and integrity are not opposite forces, but
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“twin ideals.”

265

Universality and integrity complement each other within the

common process of the development of human rights266 because universality in the
broadest sense means universal and integral adherence.267 Like the ICJ’s Genocide
case has demonstrated, reservations, combined with the object and purpose test, offers
the best way to maximize those two elements and develop international human rights
law. However, in the absence of the object and purpose test or, in the case of the
Vienna Convention, in absence of any objective mechanism for its implementation,
there is no safeguard to ensure that universality and integrity are harmonized and
balanced. In other words, under the Vienna Convention reservation regime,
universality is favored over integrity, which is afforded a theoretical protection,
lacking any efficient enforcement system.
This over-estimated need for flexibility is the result of a short-term
perspective, which sees universality as a primary objective for treaty law. Under this
approach, universal adherence to human rights treaties provides stronger consensual
force to international agreements, which permits subsequent substantial developments
protecting the integrity of the norms.268 Universality of human rights treaties should
be stressed out because “an approach to the convention[s] that emphasizes
universality may, in time, also serve the goal of integrity; universality can be viewed
as complementary to integrity and not in opposition to it.” 269 It is certainly defendable
that this argument is relevant to the reservations debate. However, its validity is
subordinated to a short-term vision. Indeed, the universal acceptance of human rights
265
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treaties developed through the liberal use of reservations has certainly not provided
integrity to the extent it was supposed to. When one looks at the rate of withdrawal of
reservations,270 supposed to reflect the increasing integrity of human rights treaties,
there are many reasons to doubt that universality at any rate will always serve
integrity. Therefore, the “ gradualistic” approach 271 of searching universality for the
sake of integrity works to a certain extent, and for a limited period of time. When this
period is over, one has to go on with the gradual process. In sum, “the modern
approach should be viewed as harmonizing-rather than choosing betweenuniversality and integrity.” 272

ii. An ongoing process: from universality to integrity.
The liberal use of reservations was supposed to promote universality, and
consecutively, integrity for human rights. We have demonstrated that this universality
was only formal, and have observed that the level of acceptance had probably already
achieved a maximum level, although not amounting to universal acceptance. A certain
level of integrity has probably been created through universal adherence to
international treaties, but generally, integrity has been pushed into the background of
human rights development. Now that formal universality as an objective has been
(substantially) attained, it is time to promote the evolution of the system towards the
successive step. If universality and integrity can really be seen as complementary in a
unique process, it seems that the time has come to get into the second phase of the
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gradualistic approach to reservations law, and to promote integrity in itself, not only
as a correlative of universality.

Under a long-term perspective, it is justified to see universality and integrity
not as opposite but as complementary objectives. The Vienna Convention reservation
regime appeared to be relatively successful in the promotion of the universality
objective, but also relatively ineffective in safeguarding integrity as an interdependent
goal. It has tried to “ maximiz(e) universal application of multilateral treaties, at the
cost of compromising its integrity.” 273 As we have seen, this failure is due to the
inadequate uniform nature of the flexible system, overly based on a traditional
perspective of international law.

The Vienna Convention system is based on a vision of a Westpahlian
international society, and of States’ sovereignty rooted in a slightly nuanced version
of the 19th century world order. The control that States still exercise on the
development of human rights law through the use of reservations echoes the old
argument that human rights and freedoms are primarily a matter of domestic concern.
This argument seems somehow completely obsolete in a 21st century where the world
is seen as a ‘global village,’ economies are totally integrated and our societies
increasingly interdependent. Global problems, transnational issues need to be
addressed not only through international cooperation and inter-governmental
negotiations. New actors have to be integrated in the regulation system, and be able to
contest and challenge the exceeding power of States at the international community
273
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level. The emergence of the “New Sovereignty” concept demonstrates the centrality
of individuals in modern international law.

Law can restrain, or advance the evolution of a society. The current law of
reservation contains the development of human rights law through treaties into an
obsolete system. This paper will now demonstrate that significant changes of
reservations rules could allow the normal path of human rights development to go on,
from universality to more integrity.
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CHAPTER 4
SEARCHING OBJECTIVITY FOR AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD: EXISTING
SOLUTIONS, ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS.

The debate over reservations to human rights treaties and their fundamentally
paradoxical nature is relatively old. When dealing with the subject, one has to be
“aware of the perilous nature of the exercise, particularly in view of the complexity
and technicality of the topic and the politically very sensitive nature of some of its
aspects.” 274 That is why the subject has been the ferment of so many academic
controversies, and provoked serious oppositions between advocates of a statu quo,
and supporters of change. We have demonstrated that the current system hampers the
natural development of human rights law towards greater uniformity and strength. We
have also recognized the essential role of reservations in this development process,
and it seems fundamental to keep this in mind while attempting to formulate
proposals for reforms. Among the reformist group itself, various solutions has been
offered. They either promote internalization of reservation rules; radical procedural
transformations within the Vienna Convention system of reservations; or a restoration
of the object and purpose test by the creation of an objective mechanism. This section
will focus on an analysis of the pro’s and con’s of existing solutions and alternatives
systems of reservations and demonstrate the necessity and logic of an objective
system with respect to human rights treaties.
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A. Relying on States, repairing traditional reservations rules.

1. « Prendre le mal à la racine, » reforming the Vienna Convention reservation
regime.

Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was one of the
greatest achievements in the codification of international law, it is far from being
perfect. Indeed, one could wonder how a single framework convention could fit the
rules for every kind of international agreements, which can be very dissimilar in
nature.275 The inadequacy of the Vienna Convention reservation regime with respect
to human rights treaties has lead several commentators to argue for a reform of the
Vienna Convention. The proposals are mainly attempts to rationalize the system, and
to reinforce the standard of the compatibility test by corresponding objective
mechanisms.

i. Renormalizing consent.
A basic proposal has been the abandon of the tacit consent rule of article
20(5). The suggestion is based on the idea that States should play a more active role
with the preservation of the integrity of the treaty. Thus, States would be required to
actively respond to every reservations formulated by other parties. By forcing States
to react on other parties’ reservations, one increases the attention over reservations,
and decreases the risk of incompatible reservation significantly.276 Moreover, it is
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logical to give a more important sense of responsibility to States. After all, through
the integrity of the treaty, it is their consent that is protected. The tacit rule of 20(5) is
a good excuse for States to neglect their general duty to act in good faith under the
treaty.277 The obligation to act in good faith includes “a mechanism for determining
the extent of the legal obligations assumed by states or other subjects of international
law.” 278 If the tacit consent rule is not, in theory, in contradiction with the obligation
to act in good faith, the passivity resulting from this negative mode of expression279
seems somehow conflicting with the positive nature of the obligation to act in good
faith. Adopting a rule pushing states to react to reservations appears a suitable method
to ensure a better respect for the pacta sunt servanda principle.280

However if the replacement of the tacit rule is desirable in theory, it might be
difficult in practice. Indeed, as we have seen, the twelve months limit is inadapted to
the administrative reality. Obliging every state to react to every reservation to every
treaty they sign within twelve months presupposes that states will have the capacities
and resources to do so. It might take several dozens of agents working full time to
obtain a reaction on time. It is unlikely that small or developing countries will ever be
able to “watch the clock”

281

and respect the deadline. On the other hand, lengthening

the twelve-month limit would affect the relevance of the states’ reactions to
reservations and impair their validity. A more fundamental question emphasizes the
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difficulty of such a reform: what happens if, notwithstanding the obligation, a Sate
party fails to react to a reservation? In sum, “this suggestion seems wildly
implausible, but its objective is laudable.” 282

ii. The preventive method.
The Vienna Convention could also develop a more preventive approach to
reservations law, rather than the contemporary curative method. Indeed, under the
present system, the validity of reservations is asserted ex post facto, what does not
encourage clarity or legal certainty. On the basis of the “better to prevent than to cure”
maxim, the method could be reversed and provide for an a priori validity review.
The example of the Organization of the American States (O.A.S.) provides a
relevant model. Indeed, the practice of reservation under the O.A.S. system requires
states to circulate the reservations they intend to adopt before ratifying the treaty.283
This allows the other parties to know instantly what is the real intent of the reserving
state while adopting the treaty. It also allocates them the chance to express their
opinion in advance regarding the validity of the reservations formulated.284
Consecutively, the reserving state can review the formulation or content of its
reservations to conform to the comments of the other parties and ensure its validity.
The validity of the reservation is therefore determined before its entry into force,
further disputes on the matter are avoided and the overall legal certainty of the treaty
is reinforced.
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However, the circulation method is still dependent on “contract-based
assumptions that are inappropriate to human rights treaties.” 285 It leaves the
determination of the objective compatibility test in the hands of states, which can, a
priori as much as a posteriori, ensure a maximum respect for their mutual sovereignty
and thus restrain the development of international accountability for human rights
violations. Therefore, it seems that an independent watchdog would be more reliable
for the protection of the interest of the treaty itself, and more equipped for an
objective protection of an appropriate balance between flexibility and integrity.

Finally, the proposals on the reform of the Vienna Convention are unlikely to
succeed for other simple, but fundamental, reasons. The Vienna Convention was the
result of a very long process, incredible efforts and has acquired the status of a
customary norm.286 A project to reform the Convention would consequently create
substantive and tumultuous opposition. Moreover, the reforming process would take a
long time and could lead to more confusion for a result that is not guaranteed.
Therefore it seems reasonable to search for more convenient and practical methods to
improve the system, notably through the increasing recourse to internalized treaty
reservations systems.
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2. Treaty systems: internalizing reservation law.

The dispositions of the Vienna Convention apply as default rules because it is
clear that the most efficient system for reservations would be an independent set of
rules regarding conditional consent in each treaty. If human rights treaties stated the
rules applicable to reservations, the level of uncertainty and the ambiguity regarding
the issue would be considerably reduced. Indeed, the rules could easily be formatted
to the particular context and nature of the treaty. Through the negotiations, sensitive
issues and areas of concern have been identified, and allowed treaty makers to decide
the most adapted reservations mechanisms and rules in the light of the travaux
préparatoires. The internalization of reservation law would permit an efficient
management of the issue of conditional consent and reduce significantly successive
disputes and technical discussions over the entry into force or the application of the
treaty.

i. Prohibiting reservations?
Some treaties simply prohibit the formulation of reservations.287 It is claimed
that the possibility of reservations opens the possibility to ruin the work accomplished
during the negotiations. Multilateral treaties, and human rights treaties in particular,
are complicated to negotiate, and difficult to build. The adoption of a text is the result
of long process, incommensurate efforts and is dependant on fragile deals and tradeoffs obtain by diplomats. Offering the possibility to neglect those achievements
irrespective of their nature at the time of their adoption, could be regarded as having acquired a
customary value.” ILC Report II, supra note 108, at para. 58.
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through reservations is a threat to the moral authority of the text and open the door to
the annihilation of the negotiators’ success. Furthermore, it endangers the norm
making process to a serious extent: why would diplomat struggle to conciliate if the
result of their efforts is likely to be demolished by reservations? states have the
opportunity to make their voices and arguments heard during the negotiations. Once a
text is adopted, states should not be allowed to simply turn back to what has been
achieved. As Judge Alvarez poetically put it, once concluded, human rights
conventions “are distinct from [their preparatory] work and have acquired a life of
their own; they can be compared to ships which leave the yards in which they have
been built, and sail away independently, no longer attached to the dockyard. [They]
must be interpreted without regard to the past, and only with regard to the future.” 288
However, this view is relatively simplistic. First of all because reservations do
not have the destroying potential that one could imagine. They are often devices to
reinforce what has been negotiated, and provide certainty on the extent of the treaty
dispositions. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that, in general, reservations do not
deal with substantive rules of treaties and have a relatively modest effect on the treaty
as a whole.289 Reservations are not automatically a menace to the indivisibility of
human rights conventions.290 In addition, the absence of reservations possibilities in
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the context of human rights treaties seems somehow idealistic.291 Although the goal of
these treaties, the general good, renders every restriction to it suspicious,292
reservations are crucial to the existence of human rights agreements. They allow a
greater adherence and reinforce the moral authority of the conventions. More
importantly, they allow the essential level of flexibility necessary to deal with core
issues of states’ sovereignty. 293 The ‘living’ and legislative nature of human rights
treaties implies a certain degree of vagueness surrounding them and reservations
constitute one of the safety valve which allow greater legal security with regards to
human rights commitments. Considering the complexity of negotiations and the often
fragile nature of the resulting texts, it seems reasonable to consider reservations as a
vital tool for the human rights treaty regime.294

ii. Conditioning reservations?
Nevertheless, including specific dispositions within the treaty would certainly
rationalize the use of reservations and limit their potential negative impacts. Explicit
list of permissible and non-permissible reservations would eliminate doubts
surrounding the compatibility test. Explicit dispositions would ensure that
reservations do not threaten the non-derogable nature of certain rights.295 Obviously,
291
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the inclusion of procedural requirements in the treaty would increase significantly the
security of the text and reduce the possibilities of disputes regarding reservations. An
essential rule would require any reservation to be sufficiently specific to avoid
uncertainty on its scope. Indeed, “imprecise reservations cheat the requirements of the
Vienna Convention.” 296 Therefore, treaties should ensure that every reservation refer
to a specific disposition of the treaty, or is labeled in such a manner that its scope of
application is clearly identifiable.297 Example can be taken on the European
Convention of Human Rights, which prohibits reservations of general character and
requires mention of the domestic law justifying the reservation.298 Although this later
requirement could appear relatively incommodious, it certainly allows greater
certainty, and permit other states parties, or a third party, to be informed and to
understand

the

rationale

behind

the

reservations299

and

avoid

further

misunderstandings.
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iii. Collegiality.
Another common idea is the creation of a voting or collective system to
enforce the compatibility test by collegiality. In combination with an explicit consent
rule,300 the “collegiate system” would rely on the collective determination of the
validity of reservations by the parties.301 Such a mechanism had long been
demanded302 but was rejected by the Vienna Conference as a general solution, under
the pressure of the ILC, which argued that it would “tilt the balance towards
inflexibility and might make general agreements on reservations more difficult.” 303
The value of the collegiality system was nevertheless implicitly acknowledged in the
Vienna Convention. Indeed, article 20(3) of the Vienna Convention states that
reservations to treaties constitutive of international organizations require the
acceptance of the competent body of the organization to be valid.304 Considering that
many international organizations bodies express consent through a majority vote, the
rule embodied in article 20(3) equals a collegiate system.305 If the collegiate system is
indeed, especially appropriate in the case of constitutive treaties, it might very well be
so with respect to other treaties, including human rights treaties.
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme (A propos de l’arrêt Belilos du 29 avril 1988), 1989 REVUE
GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 273, 305-312 (1989).
300
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301
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Such a mechanism cumulate the advantage of avoiding controversies and
possible conflicts resulting from different interpretations of the object and purpose of
the treaty, while not depending on subjective reciprocal techniques. Furthermore, such
a collective method seems totally appropriate to the nature of human rights treaties
and other legislative agreements, which rely on a common and collective interest of
states parties. The Convention on Elimination of the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination,306 which is considered as “the most effective international human
rights instrument in existence,” 307 has adopted a collegiate system in its article 20.
Thus, “a reservation [to this convention] shall be considered incompatible or
inhibitive if at least two-thirds of the states Parties to this Convention object to it.” 308
The two-third mechanism ensures a certain degree of objectivity in the determination
of the compatibility of a reservation and is protective of the integrity of the treaty. The
collective decision implies coherence with respect to the definition of the object and
purpose test. However, the protective value of such a mechanism is not absolute.
Indeed, the system “has an intrinsic flexibility that implies a loss of control,
proportional to the growing number of states Parties.” 309 In fact, the two-third rule
will be more and more difficult to apply as the number of parties to the treaty
increase.310 Additionally, such a collective system would deny any substantive value
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to objections, which do not amount to a two-third majority311 and would complicate
the determination of the effects of reservations towards objecting states.312
Moreover, if it is true that a collective reaction would allow to reduce the
influence of political pressures significantly and prevent the disarticulation of the
treaty,313 the collegial system does not completely eradicate the risk of corruption of
the objectivity of the test by extra-legal factors. The collegiate system leaves the
determination of the compatibility to states.314 States are rational actors, and many
factors are susceptible to interfere with the ability of states, individually and
collectively, to act as watchdogs of the integrity of the treaty. If states keep control on
the reservation regime, they will naturally protect their sovereignty and it is likely that
a maximum flexibility will be retained.

It is unquestionable that the internalization of specific reservations rules within
treaties would highly simplify the system, especially with regard to human rights
treaties. As some have predicted, “the inclusion of rules in the treaty text eliminates
uncertainty and possible controversy in dealing with reservations. Internal
reservations provisions optimally should become a widespread practice in the future.
The increased awareness of the uncertainties in reservations law and of the wide
variety of rules in existence counsels such a change.” 315 Nevertheless, the change
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attended never occurred,316 and most treaties still rely on the reservation regime of the
Vienna Convention. Indeed, the reservations clauses are always terribly delicate to
negotiate. Instituting a comprehensive treaty regime, which would also internally
regulate the use of reservations would impair states’ sovereignty to a greater extent.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the internalization of reservations rules is silently
rejected by most states, which jealously try to maintain the lex generalis and an
ambiguous flexible system that is clearly favorable to them. Thus, if the Vienna
Convention system was not so favorable to states, they might have a greater incentive
to be more active in the negotiation of reservations clauses within the context of each
treaty. However, there is a possibility to influence the behavior of states through the
intermediary of an independent actor, which would act as an objective arbiter, and
ensure the revival of the object and purpose test.

B. The necessity of an independent adjudication.

1. Which independent arbiter?

The conclusion resulting from the preceding remarks emphasizes that the
system cannot and should not rely on states to ensure an objective determination of
the validity of reservations, and safeguard the integrity of human rights treaties.
However, it is idealistic to think that states would just remain passive in the process of
reviewing the validity of reservations, and gently obey to whatever decision a certain
arbiter would have made.
316
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sovereignty,317 and it is unquestionable that states will use all possible means to
ensure that they continue to be so. Changing the current system of reservations would
require the consent of states, explicitly or implicitly. There is no doubt that the quest
for more objectivity within the law of reservations will demand sensitivity to political
questions, and a great amount of diplomatic sense when dealing with states’
privileges.
In sum, the perfect candidate to play the role of the independent decision
maker should combine legal expertise to face the technicality of reservations law; the
ability to take into account political factors and to control the political consequences
of its decisions to a certain extent; and finally the capacity to act in total objectivity
while maintaining a constructive dialogue with states. Various possibilities can be
considered. Other elements should also be taken into account. Who should designate
the independent authority? Under which procedure? Should the arbiter be an
individual or an entity? Should it be of judicial or political nature?
Various solutions have been offered. However, it seems that only one could
satisfy those requirements. Unfortunately the appropriate solution seems to amount to
a revolution in the world of international law. But it will be argued that this revolution
is natural, and would be consistent with the evolution of the international society in
the 21st century.
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i. The middle-man option.
It has been claimed that the improvement of reservation rules could also lie in
the appointment of the depository as a general default decision-maker.318 It is argued
that this solution would permit a rationalization of the reservations system by creating
an objective mechanism, detached from the control of states’ parties, for the
application of the compatibility test. Moreover, due to its central place within the
treaty system, the depository would be the most convenient entity to perform the task
of determining the compatibility of a reservation. Indeed, the relevance and efficiency
of the compatibility test would be maximized considering that the depository has
knowledge of all the reservations formulated, and has a neutral position: the
depository plays the role of the middle-man in the current treaty regime. The
depository already has the power to ask information and require explanations on the
ratifying instruments it receives;319 expanding these powers seems pragmatic and
efficient.320 Thus, by enlarging the role of the depository to the control of
reservations’ validity, one guarantee the objectivity of the mechanism of reservations’
compatibility test.
Nevertheless, “like other reform proposals, [this idea] is too ambitious and has
no chance of adoption.” 321 Indeed, the question of the compatibility of a reservation
with the object and purpose of the treaty is eminently a legal question subject to
judicial adjudication, which largely goes beyond the traditional functions of the treaty
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depository, which does not include judicial tasks.322 A reform of the rules of the
Vienna Convention323 or of the specific dispositions of each treaty dealing with the
functions of the depository could change the situation, but it seems inappropriate to
afford such an important decision-making power to the depository. Moreover, there is
a significant probability that this option would complicate the overall system and
endanger the traditional role of the depository. Thus, the middle-man option appears
to be half of a solution. If there is to be an independent decision-maker, this latter
ought to be armed to define the compatibility of reservations in an efficient and
suitable fashion.

ii. National Courts.
Professor Tyagi has recently suggested that the potential role of national
courts in the reservations debate has been largely underestimated.324 He argues that
the importance of international human rights treaties in national litigations is
increasing and that consequently, the question of reservations is progressively more
likely to arise in domestic courts. He notes that only very few national cases has been
dealing with the issue of reservations to human rights treaties, because courts are
generally reluctant to question the legality of their government consent to an
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international agreement. He explains, however, that the possibility of such a review
does exists and illustrate his argument with few concrete examples.325
It is true that national courts constitute a very adequate forum to review the
“nexus [of reservations] with domestic conditions.” 326 However, the question of the
compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty might be impossible to assess
in the context of national procedures. First, very few judicial organs have the benefit
of a sufficient independence to officially question the appropriateness of the
executive’s, or legislature’s, vision of what kind of national particularity justifies a
reservation. Secondly, not only the understanding of the treaty might be too limited,
but also, national courts’ interpretation of the treaty’ object might differ from a
country to another, and the probability of a fragmented “object and purpose” criteria
remain.327
Professor Tyagi finally concludes that the national courts might be a useful
complement to the international system.328 However, considering the precedents
remarks, significant doubts appears as to whether this additional mechanism would
actually be of positive influence on the international mechanism.

iii. The International Court of Justice.
The International Court of Justice is the highest judicial authority within the
United Nations system.329 The world Court consequently enjoys a certain prestige and
a strong moral authority. It has been argued that it could be the most appropriate
325
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entity to endorse the role of the independent decision maker with respect to the
validity of reservations and their compatibility to human rights treaties.330
First, it is unquestionable that the ICJ possesses the appropriate expertise to
deal with the technicality of the legal questions related to the validity of
reservations.331 Then, by definition, the Court enjoys total independence from
states,332 and would certainly be able to decide objectively on the legality of
reservations.
Not only the ICJ holds material competence to be such a decision maker, but it
also has jurisdiction to be so. Universal human rights treaties are the fruits of the
United Nations mandate. Under the United Nations Charter,333 the General Assembly,
the Security Council, and under certain circumstances,334 other bodies or agencies,
have the power to request an advisory opinion to the world court on any relevant legal
matter. The question of the validity of reservations to human rights treaties is
eminently a legal matter. Considering the broad scope of application of the question,
“it would be a particularly appropriate subject for an ICJ advisory opinion of general
applicability.” 335 This is illustrated by the Genocide Opinion of 1951. The General
Assembly automatically turned back to the ICJ when it faced uncertainty regarding
329
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the legal effects of the reservations to the Genocide Convention. After all, the most
authoritative rule in the law of reservations remains the Reservations Opinion of the
ICJ. Since the general competence of the world court is not questionable, neither on a
legal basis, nor on functional grounds, it would seem reasonable to consider the ICJ as
a noteworthy candidate for the position of the permanent independent adjudicator in
charge with the enforcement of the compatibility test.

However, practically, this solution is quite problematic. If advisory opinions
of the ICJ enjoy a remarkable moral value within the academic world, it is far from
being the case with respect to states. On one hand, the requesting U.N. body would
certainly obey to the opinion of the Court and consider the validity of the concerned
reservations in conformity with the view of the Court. On the other hand, states have
generally a relative respect for the decisions of the Court.336 As an example, article 29
of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discriminations Against Women
has establish a possibility of an ICJ decision in case of dispute over the legality of
reservations to the Convention. In practice, an infinitesimal number of states has
accepted this possibility.337 Additionally, states would not be parties to the advisory
opinion, and therefore, would not be legally bound by it.338 Although they would have
to face criticisms due to the moral authority of the Court’s opinions, they can still
maintain their positions, and with the process of time, the authority of the opinion
might decrease, while the invalid reservations would remain.
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Furthermore, the process of the advisory opinion is relatively long. It requires
lengthy researches and preparatory investigations from the Court. Relying on the
procedure of the advisory opinion to review the validity of questionable reservations
to every human rights treaty could lead to perpetual extensive proceedings leading to
uncertain results. Indeed, while the qualifications and abilities of the judges to
produce the wisest opinions cannot be questioned, the Court still somehow detached
from the context of the treaty to which the reservations relate. We have seen that the
validity of reservations is a very sensitive and complex issue, which requires a
profound understanding of the treaty concerned, its nature and context.339 This
distance between the ICJ and the various specificities of particular human rights
regimes lead to some doubts about the ICJ’s advisory opinion option.
Moreover, the ICJ is a pure judicial body. Due to the intrinsic nature of
international law, it has, however, dealt with questions closely related to international
relations theories and political issues. But the world court has always been somehow
uncomfortable with politically rooted legal questions. Now we have seen that the
legality of reservations is profoundly rooted in sensitive political considerations.
Therefore, one can question the ability of the Court to demonstrate sufficient political
sensitivity and diplomatic skills to review the legality of reservations to human rights
treaties in a constructive manner. In a way, the ICJ suffers from its judicial nature to
handle efficiently the task of evaluating the compatibility of reservations to the object
and purpose of human rights treaties.
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2. The perfect candidate: treaty bodies.

If the highest judicial authority in the world appears in some way unable to
deal efficiently with the question of the reservations to human rights treaties, one
could wonder who will be. In fact if the debate over reservations remain controversial
after so many years, it is because it is disputed between the traditional actors of the
international scene. However, we have seen that the human rights movement
possesses a dynamic of its own, which differs from the forces driving general
international law. The various monitoring bodies that human rights treaties have
created have played one of the most influential roles in the development of human
rights law. Therefore, it seems logical that these same organs have a significant role to
play in the continuing challenge posed by reservations to human rights conventions.
We will see that these organs have not only the appropriate competence to deal with
the issue, but also a natural jurisdiction to do so.

The traditional problem characterizing human rights conventions and the
rights that they create is the lack of enforcement mechanisms. However, many human
rights treaties are not completely toothless. The creation of the European Court of
Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) was the first example of an efficient enforcement
mechanism. However, the example was of limited influence. Indeed, the ECHR was
an exceptional judicial body, the success of which can only be understood with
regards to the particularities of the European regional legal order. The dynamism of
the Council of Europe, under the auspices of which the Court was created, rely on a
necessarily requires an in-depth understanding of those realities.” Tyagi, supra note 14, at 257.
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strong solidarity between European nations, and their common dedication to prevent
the atrocities of dictatorial regimes that they all faced during the second world
conflict.
Nevertheless, the ECHR constituted the model for the creation of other organs
charged with the review of states’ compliance with their human rights obligations. In
other regional areas, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African
Commission on Human Rights were strongly inspired by their European predecessor.
These bodies have been relatively successful in increasing states’ compliances with
their obligations to respect human rights, but their success is largely due to the
regional context.
At the universal level, the creation of a similar judicial organ entitled to
enforce human rights conventions has been more difficult. Since March 2003
however, the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC) is activated and will be
charged of the prosecution and punishment of individuals responsible for the worst
human rights violations. However, the ICC has no jurisdiction over human rights
complaints against states. This does not mean that states are free from international
scrutiny.

i. A special competence.
Although the implementation of international human rights conventions relies
primarily on national enforcement, the system is complemented by international
measures, which are essential to the effective observance of human rights.340 These
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implementation schemes vary in their intensity and functions.341 Not every human
rights convention benefit of these enforcement mechanisms. However, all the main
instruments are accompanied by some kind of implementation procedures at the
international level.
The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has established
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and an Ad Hoc
Conciliation Commission,342 the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has created
the Human Rights Committee,343 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women has set up a Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women,344 the Convention Against Torture instituted the
Committee against Torture,345 the Convention on the Rights of the Child has also
created its Committee,346 and so did the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.347
Each of these treaty bodies has a specific mandate, adapted to their political
context and subject matter.348 Although their competence and duties varies from a
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treaty to another, some common features characterize them.349 Their general mission
is to monitor states parties’ compliance with the treaty on the basis of a mandatory
reporting procedure. However, states’ compliance with the procedural requirements of
the reporting process is largely unsatisfactory,350 and the efficiency of the monitoring
system has been dramatically impaired by incomplete, inaccurate or overdue reports.
The enforcement scheme is sometimes reinforced by the existence of procedures for
individual complaints of treaty violations.351 However, due to their optional nature
and the small rate of states’ adherence to these individual petition procedures and the
coexistence of efficient regional mechanisms, their complementary value has been
relatively limited.352

These treaty bodies have a very peculiar nature, quite unique in the area of
international law. First, they are created by the states parties to their constitutive
treaties and are not, therefore, organs of the United Nations strictly speaking.353 Thus,
although materially and financially dependent on the United Nations,354 they have
been able to develop a certain autonomy of action.355 This energy has been amplified
by the particular status of the experts composing these treaty bodies.
What is striking at the first glance is that although these committees have to
deal with the implementation of rules of international law, they are not strictly
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composed of lawyers. Indeed, the members of these bodies are “experts.” These
persons are all of very elevated professional quality and are all highly qualified.
Although many of them will, in practice, have substantial legal experience,356 the
requirements for the qualifications to the functions of expert are primarily high moral
qualities and extended competence in the field of human rights.357 This diversity in
the composition of treaty bodies has allowed to broaden the expertise of these organs
in a useful manner. Political scientists, journalists, sociologists or economists can
bring pertinent eclectic views to the treaty bodies and widen their perspectives. Thus,
treaty bodies benefit of the expertise of specialists from other human sciences, which
improve the understanding of human rights in practice. This ability of the treaty
bodies to adopt a non-strictly legal approach would be especially valuable with
respect to the analysis of the validity of reservations, which is a legal question closely
related to political and other extra-legal elements.

The highly precious expertise of the members of these treaty bodies is
strengthened by several other qualities that render them particularly competent to deal
with reservations issues. As we have seen, most reservations are based on cultural,
religious or domestic considerations. Therefore, the fact that special consideration is
given to “equitable geographical distribution” and the “representation of the different
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forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems” 358 in the election of the
members of these organs is of paramount importance. However, this proportional
representation of national and cultural identities is not synonymous of national
obedience. The independence of the treaty bodies is protected by the assurance that
the experts serve in their “personal capacity.” Although nominated and elected by the
states parties, the experts are personally accountable and are acting in independence
from their respective governments.
Nevertheless, this independence is somehow relative. It is an institutional or
functional independence, but not an individual independence. When acting in their
capacity of experts, the members of the treaty bodies enjoy total independence; they
have no mandate from their government and do not represent them;359 they act as
members of an independent organ. But, the experts’ mission within these treaty bodies
is only part-time. And “although members [of these bodies] receive emoluments from
the United Nations rather than their respective national governments, the level of
emoluments has been very low. The effect in practice has been that membership […]
has been limited to persons receiving a regular salary, in academic or governments
posts.” 360 Thus, the functional independence of the experts is attenuated by the lack of
personal independence. “However, the continuous contact of members with high-level
legal and political activity within their respective national systems brings critically
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important practical knowledge and expertise to the [Committee]’s considerations,” 361
and is thus an important advantage.

The special status of treaty bodies members, their various national, cultural,
religious and professional backgrounds combined with their singular independence
are all advantages that give these special organs a very unique competence to deal
with reservations issues. The problem remain that their authority to endorse this
difficult mission lack legal basis.

ii. A natural jurisdiction.
The nature and functions of the human rights treaties bodies is rather vague.362
They can be described as organs of cooperation, conciliation, arbitration, litigation or
supervision.363 They are not judicial in nature, but perform tasks that are similar to
those of tribunals.364 There are also the “administrator”

365

and the “executive

organ” 366 of the treaties that establish them. Their function consist fundamentally in
the administration of the reporting system,367 the promotion, monitoring and
supervision

of

states

parties

“with

respect

to

improved

human

rights

performances.” 368 In sum, they can be described as the “parent organ” or the
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“guardian(s)” of human rights conventions

369

of which nature “includes elements of

judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative, investigative, inquisitorial, supervisory and
conciliatory functions.” 370

However, this description is quite optimistic. In practice, the power of the
committees to promote the enforcement of human rights conventions is “sadly
deficient.” 371 The treaty bodies do not have the competence to perform binding
adjudications or to declare a state in violation of the Conventions;372 they lack the
legal authority to settle controversies. Therefore, the system of the treaty bodies
cannot really be described as a direct enforcement mechanism.373
Considering this lack of formal judicial power, there seem to be no legal basis
to justify the power of these treaty bodies to review and decide on the legality of
reservations to human rights treaties. Nowhere in the dispositions constituting these
bodies and attributing them powers mention is made of any authority over the
question of reservations. As we have seen, human rights treaties usually rely on the
default system of the Vienna Convention to regulate the use of reservations.374 The
absence of reservations rules does not imply that the treaty bodies were given the
power to act on the question of reservations.375 Thus, the committees should not
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“intervene in ‘situations’, however acute or frustrating,” unless the treaties expressly
authorize them to do so.376

Some have evocated the possibility that the power of the treaty bodies over the
question of reservations would flow from article 20(3) of the Vienna Convention.377
This article provides international organizations the power to adjudicate the validity
of reservations to their constitutive instruments. A very extensive reading of this
provision could lead to consider the treaty bodies as international organizations, and
the conventions establishing them as constitutive instruments. However, the treaty
bodies are not international organizations, and the human rights conventions are not
constitutive instruments.378 Although these organs enjoy some kind of independence
from the United Nations,379 they have no separate legal identity. Human rights treaties
do institute monitoring bodies, but their primary object is to create rights for
individuals and obligations for states parties, not to be a constitutive charter of
international organizations. They are not the equivalent of the United Nations Charter.
Article 20(3) of the Vienna Convention has therefore no applicability whatsoever with
respect to human rights treaty bodies to deal with the legality of reservations.

Nevertheless, other factors can justify the natural jurisdiction of these organs
to adjudicate the validity of reservations. First, the vague and incomplete nature of the
provisions establishing the treaty bodies has obliged them to demonstrate practical
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sense and develop a certain creativity.380 The treaties concerned are important
instruments constitutive of the International Bill of Rights and are very unlikely to be
amended to ameliorate procedural aspects of the committees’ work. Therefore, facing
practical needs, the treaty bodies, inspired by the leading role of the Human Rights
Committee, had to espouse a dynamic interpretation of their powers to be able to
perform their tasks in an efficient fashion.381 Thus, the committees have developed a
comprehensive set of procedures that facilitates their work and reinforce their original
powers.382 This active approach has not been limited to procedural matters. The
committees did not limit their work to a passive review of states’ reports but have
demonstrate a certain aggressiveness to enhance the limited potential of the reporting
system. Considering the overall lack of enthusiasm of states for the reporting
procedure, committees have used all kind of techniques to expand the inquisitorial
nature of the system. States’ reports are deeply analyzed and explored, representatives
are submitted to comprehensive interrogations, the accuracy and relevance of the
information are strictly verified through a developed comparison process with other
sources from intergovernmental organizations, United Nations agencies and
NGO’s. 383 This has allowed greater transparency and forced states to increase their
attention to the quality and content of their reports. Although the committees do not
have the power to condemn states for violations of the reporting process requirements,
states are more and more likely to comply with the demands of the treaty bodies
380
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simply to avoid the costs of a bad publicity and future harassment from the
committees. Indeed, the publicity of the committees’ work is fundamental to the
functioning of the process and the development of a real state accountability. Their
conclusions and recommendations are published in official documents and press
releases both at the national and international level and communicated to NGO’s and
other human rights actors in the civil society; committee members participate to
academic conferences and official meetings, write articles on the work of the
committees and the problems they face.384 This publicity around the work of the treaty
bodies and states’ cooperation within the monitoring process push states to improve
the quality of their participation to the procedure.

Treaty organs have also manifested their boldness with respect to
reservations.385 The energetic review of states’ compliance has included a continuous
control of reservations justifications and appropriateness.386 “In the course of
consideration of states’ reports, the committee(s) enquire about reservations and
request states to review, reduce and withdraw their reservations.” 387 The process does
not amount to an adjudicative mechanism, but rather constitutes an interactive process
based on a constructive dialogue with states. It nevertheless provides treaty bodies a
functional argument to evaluate reservations.388 Indeed, if the role of the committees
is the monitoring of states’ compliance with their obligations, they need to know to
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what is the extent of the party’s obligations under the treaty. 389 The scope of their
obligations is shaped by reservations. Therefore, it seems natural and logical that
treaty bodies implicitly possess the authority to review reservations.390 Indeed, “if an
instrument creates a treaty body whose mission it is to study and comment upon ‘the
measures the states parties have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized
herein and on the progress made in the enjoyments of those rights,’ then the treaty
body must inevitably examine just what norms actually bind the state party. To do
this, it must pronounce itself on the validity of reservations.” 391 The Vienna
Convention itself seems to support this conclusion of “common-sense.”

392

Indeed, the

rules of treaty interpretation requires to take into account “any instrument which was
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.” 393
Consequently, in their interpretation of the treaties, the monitoring organs are legally
bound to consider reservations.394

States have implicitly accepted the development of these implied powers by
the treaty bodies. Those who respect their obligation to report faithfully have
complied with their increased procedural duties or failed to object; and those who do
not perform their obligations have obviously little legitimacy to complain. The
constructive and forward-looking nature of the evaluation of reservations has also
naturally conducted states to participate to the dialogue with the committees. By
tacitly acquiescing to the transformation of the treaty bodies’ role and submitting to
389
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the dynamic interpretation of their implied powers, states have legitimized the
committees’ authority to deal with reservations. 395 Indeed, states’ practice has to be
fully considered for the interpretation of a treaty.396 The submission of states to the
treaty bodies’ practice of evaluating reservations has created a sort of custom that has
acquired legal value.

Consequently, the jurisdiction of the treaty organs to deal with reservations
issues is not only natural or functional, but also has a legal basis. Moreover, the nature
of the monitoring procedures developed by treaty bodies seems to be particularly
adapted to the question of the compatibility of reservations to human rights treaties.
Because they operate on the basis of a transparent, public, continuous, evolutive,
inter-active and forward-looking system, treaty bodies are particularly well armed to
deal with the complexity of reservations issues.397 This conclusion is supported by
various precedents.

C. The practice test.

1. The precedents.

The practice of the various human rights treaty organs demonstrates the
delicate nature of the reservations issues. In general, treaty bodies have demonstrated
394
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a relative prudence in dealing with the issue of reservations.398 However, the
inefficiency of the Vienna Convention regime being increasingly apparent with the
time, they have progressively adopted a more assertive position and developed a
direct or indirect jurisprudence that demonstrate their ability to face the challenge of
the validity of reservations. The different nature of the various legal systems at the
international level have lead to diverse tactics in the development of competences
over reservations. However, the general trend seems to confirm that treaty bodies are
particularly adapted forums for the question of the legality of reservations to human
rights conventions.

i. Regional Organs.
The first regional organ to have asserted its competence over the validity of
reservations was the (former)399 European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter
the Commission). In the Temeltasch case,400 the Commission asserted for the first
time its competence to determine the validity of a Swiss declaration to the European
Convention on Human Rights.401 The case concerned a Dutch citizen of Turkish
origins who has been arrested for drug possession and later released after acquittal by
the Swiss court. Mr. Temeltasch was however requested to pay the cost of the
remuneration of the interpreter who assisted him during the trial, and he argued that
this was in contradiction with article 6 §3 of the European Convention of Human

implemented. Only the Committee could provide continuous and consistent oversight of reservations,”
Baylis, supra note 58, at 314.
398
See Cohen-Jonathan, supra note, at 286.
399
See Eleventh Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights, opened for signature May 11,
1994, entered into force Nov.11, 1998.
400
Request N° 9116/80, Alparslan Temeltasch v. Switzerland, Commission Report, May 5, 1982
[hereinafter Temeltasch case].
401
See generally, Imbert, supra note 299.

85

Rights. The Swiss government argued that it had joined an interpretative declaration
of article 6 to its ratification of the convention, and that it was exonerated from the
obligation to provide free interpreters to criminal defendants.
The Commission firstly stated that the attacked declaration constituted a
reservation in the meaning of the Convention,402 and went on in asserting its
“absolute”

403

jurisdiction to interpret and review the validity of reservations to the

Convention, denying any legal value to the acceptation/objection game.404 The
Commission based its reasoning on the particular nature of the European Convention,
in which the objective obligations created could not be controlled by reciprocity.405
The Commission derived its competence from the necessity of a collective
mechanism to ensure the protection of the objective obligations created by the
Convention.
The decision of the Commission was very criticized for confusing its ability to
construe reservations with the power to control their legality.406 It was also attacked
for disrespecting the intention of the drafters to rely on the states system, and
endangering the system of the Convention by exercising an unjustifiable a posteriori
review of reservations.407 However weak and fragile the legal reasoning of the
Commission was, it nevertheless created a strong precedent and demonstrated that
treaty organs were able to emancipate from their original status. The strength of this
precedent was illustrated 6 years later, when the European Court of Human Rights
itself embraced the controversial issue of reservations and followed the path opened
402
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by the Commission. The Belilos Case408 has been described as one of the most
important decision of the Court409 because the unanimous judgment constituted the
first invalidation of a reservation by an international court.410

Mrs. Belilos had been charged with participation to an illegal demonstration
and condemned to pay a fine by an administrative tribunal. She argued that her right
to be judged by a judicial tribunal, according to article 6 of the European Convention,
had been violated. The Swiss government objected to her complaint arguing that it
entered a valid reservation to article 6, releasing it from the obligation to provide
more than an administrative adjudication to certain criminal accusations. In its
decision, the Court affirmed its competence to review the legality of the Swiss
reservation, and declared it invalid.411 The Court considered its authority to control
the validity of reservations as obvious and undisputable, and did not explain it
extensively.412 It simply rejected the application of the general reservations system of
the Vienna Convention,413 and relied on the same justification that the Commission
had used in the Temeltasch case. Charged with the enforcement of the Convention,414
ultimate guardian of this instrument of “European public order,”
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Kompetenz-Kompetenz power to construe its own jurisdiction416 and to interpret and
apply all the dispositions of the Convention to ensure an integral and efficient
application of the Convention.417 As illustrated in the Loizidou case,418 the
jurisprudence of the Court on the question of reservations is now completely stable.
Once again, the Court used its competence over reservations, and invalidated
Turkey’s reservation on the territorial application of the Commission’s jurisdiction.
According to what has then became “consistent practice,” Turkey should have been
aware that the Court would invalidate reservations incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention.419
Although the competence of the European organs to review the validity of
reservations seems totally unquestionable, it seems necessary to view this conclusion
in perspective. The European system of the protection of human rights is based on a
very strong regional historical solidarity,420 and operates as a constitutional regime
designed to maintain a collective protection of an ordre public européen. Therefore,
the European Convention system is original enough to operate on an exceptional and
unique regime.421 Moreover, the judicial nature and the prestige of the oldest organ422
for the protection of human rights at the supranational level largely explained the
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particular power of the Court, and can also justify an exceptional power to review the
legality of reservations.

However, the same kind of reasoning and powers has been claimed in another
regional system by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In its Advisory
Opinion on the Effect of Reservations,423 the Inter-American Court also rejected the
applicability of the acceptance/objection game on human rights treaties reservations
regime, stating that reciprocity was inadapted to the objective nature of states’
obligations.424 Thus, although the Inter-American Convention explicitly refers to the
Vienna Convention reservation regime,425 the opinion of the Inter-American Court
implied that the enforcement mechanism could also apply to the legality of
reservations.426

Consequently, various precedents at the regional level supports the idea that
treaty bodies are particularly well suited to deal with the legality of reservations and
possess an inherent authority to do so. If the particularity of the European system
limits its comparability and extension at the international level, the existence of a
similar approach at the Inter-American level, which do not have the same integrative
nature, supports the possibility to see the European system as a model for a
developing international ordre public. This latter would be based on the International
Bill of Rights and guarded by human rights treaty bodies, which would have the
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power to decide on the validity of reservations.427 No matter how idealistic this
position might seems at the moment, it has been endorsed by the United Nations
treaty organs which struggle for the development of integral human rights and the
disappearance of illegal reservations.

ii. United Nations treaty bodies.428
The procedural differences characterizing the work of the various United
Nations human rights committees have had substantial consequences on their
respective practice regarding reservations issues. However, their natural dynamism
and the passage of time have brought them to adopt a common attitude and a similar
audacity.

The first committee to face the question of reservation was the CERD
Committee.429 Facing no restrictive precedents, the CERD Committee started a very
aggressive reservation jurisprudence by pronouncing a reservation incompatible with
the CERD. However, the potential consequences of this first decision was rapidly
blown away by a Memorandum of the United Nations Secretariat denying any legal
effect to the decision,430 which considerably “restrained the CERD Committee’s role

427
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in reservations matters.” 431 Indeed, the CERD specifically provides that the
compatibility of reservations is to be determined by the two-third majority of the
parties to the treaty.432 Although the CERD Committee’s enthusiasm over
reservations issues was somehow curbed by this intervention, it remained the first
U.N. treaty body to assert its authority and to declare a reservation incompatible with
the object and purpose of a treaty.433

The reservations to CEDAW are certainly the most controversial, that is why
the CEDAW Committee has been so “uncomfortable” with them.

434

Additionally,

CEDAW contains a dispute settlement mechanism435 that, according to the United
Nations Legal Adviser,436 clearly deprived the Committee of any power over disputed
reservations. However, the CEDAW Committee has demonstrated a progressive
emancipation and confidence that conducted it to the adoption of a General Comment
on Reservations437 which significantly contributed to “the further development of law
relating to reservations.” 438 Since then, the CEDAW Committee followed the practice
of other treaty bodies by continuously inviting states to review and progressively
withdraw their invalid reservations while showing greater intransigence over
reservations matters in general.439
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The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also developed a constructive
monitoring scheme of reservations and considers that it bears “a decisive role to play
in the assessment of the validity and impact of reservations made by states parties and
will continue to systematically raise this issue with state parties.” 440

The Committee Against Torture has had a relatively limited role in the
development of reservations law. However, this can be explained by the fact that
“reservations have only been a marginal problem” to the Convention Against Torture
“which is an instrument codifying a rule of ius cogens,” 441 to which reservations are
impossible.442 States have objected to the most controversial reservations, which have
consecutively been withdrawn,443 leaving very little work to the Committee on
reservations matters. However, “there is a slow but steady improvement in the
Committee’s procedures, which may eventually reflect the body’s competence to deal
with reservations matters.” 444

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights had not real
opportunity to deal with reservations, which are part of the CESCR progressive
system of implementation. Nevertheless, the CESCR Committee recommended that
reservations should be gradually withdrawn and congratulated states that did not
attach reservations to the CESCR.445
440
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The most relevant practice which illustrate that treaty bodies have the
appropriate competence and a functional jurisdiction to deal with reservations issues
is that of the Human Rights Committee (hereinafter HRC) established by the ICCPR.
The HRC has been the leader of the U.N. human rights treaty bodies’ family in many
different respects, but especially with respect to reservations issues. The dynamism
and boldness of the HRC certainly result from its nature “ quasi-contentieuse” 446 and
from the fact that it is usually compared as “the universalist counterpart to regional
organs.” 447
Considering that its original role consisted more in a fact-finding or
monitoring mission that in a judiciary function, the Committee was first reluctant to
address the issue of reservations.448 It had to develop a gradual and progressive
strategy to expand its explicit authority and obtain the implied powers it needed. The
Committee has used the periodic reports procedure to increasingly inquire about
reservations, and built a constructive dialogue with states, to press them to review and
withdraw their reservations.449 The HRC has usually been less intrusive towards
transitional reservations than towards permanent one450 but had, in general, limited its
action to a positive exchange with states.451
The creativity of the HRC also transformed the practice of general comments.
Originally, general comments were quite indefinite in nature: they were to be issued
as the Committee “may consider appropriate.”
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reporting procedures and implementation mechanisms and invite states to ameliorate
their engagement for the protection of human rights.453 Over the time however,
general comments became more than a simple exchange of views with states. The
HRC increasingly used them to define the scope of the Covenant, and extend its
mandate.454 The combination of a more and more inquisitive reporting process dealing
with reservations and the transformation of general comments into policy tools drove
the HRC to a revolutionary decision, which has deeply transformed the debate over
reservations to human rights treaties. Although the production of a general comment
on reservations from the HRC was anticipated,455 its effects remained quite
sensational.

In its General Comment 24, the Human Rights Committee “faced with a
devastating array of reservations and declarations,” expressed its frustration with the
current law of reservations,456 controversially affirmed its sole competence to
determine the legality of reservations to the ICCPR and attempted to create a new
reservation regime for human rights treaties. According to the general comment, the
validity of reservations is to be decided by the Committee457 on the basis of their
compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty.458 Incompatible reservations
will be considered void and severed from the reserving party’s act of adherence to the
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Covenant.459 The HRC based its decision on the inadequacy and the patent failure of
the Vienna Convention regime to ensure the compatibility of reservations with the
object and purpose of the Covenant, and on the irresponsibility and passivity of states
in the implementation of the Covenant and administration of reservations.460 It also
argued that the control of the compatibility of reservations was not an adequate task
for states, and that it necessarily felt into its competence to ensure the enforcement of
the Covenant and review states parties’ compliance. 461
“This was nothing less than a revolution. It took a clear view on the power of a
treaty body in reservation matters. It set a precedent for other treaty bodies.” 462 The
HRC did not stopped there however. Conscious of the controversial position that it
had taken; it went on upholding its new reservations policy. Although it rarely
pronounced a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Covenant,463 the HRC continuously harassed states about the justification or
appropriateness of their reservations, express regrets, concerns and dissatisfaction
about their reservations. “Undoubtedly, the reservations to the ICCPR are governed
by the most progressive body of law, much to the discomfort of states.” 464
Thus, the practice of the various human rights treaties organs, both at the
regional and international level seems to confirm that the general reservation regime
of the Vienna Convention is not satisfying with respect to human rights treaties.
However contrasted, their practice with respect to reservations undeniably
459
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demonstrate that they play a considerable influence over the ongoing debate. Their
dynamism and qualification has allowed for more integral respect for human rights
through the aggressive restrictions that they have progressively imposed on states.
U.N. treaty bodies have allowed the emergence of new principles shaping the future
law of reservations, and continue to reflect their commitment to the cause of human
rights through a common struggle.465 However, the war on incompatible reservations
is not over. The achievement of the Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment 24 was certainly welcomed by human rights activists and admired by its
U.N. sisters bodies as a demonstration of the necessity for changes in reservations
law.466 Nevertheless, although they have somehow acquiesced to their increasing
authority, states are generally reluctant to the development of treaty bodies’
prerogatives and will certainly continue to struggle to maintain their privileges under
the general Vienna Convention regime.467 Additionally, the logic of the HRC’s
General Comment 24 is attenuated by its weak legal basis, and by the potential radical
consequences that its decision would have on international law.

465

“The treaty bodies have an institutionalized form of interaction with the help of periodic meetings of
their chairpersons (…). These meetings were initiated primarily to exchange thoughts on the
functioning of the treaty bodies, especially their reporting procedures. However, the scope of these
meetings has gradually expanded. Now these meetings have assumed the form of a common policy
forum of the treaty bodies, covering a wide range of issues, including reservations to human rights
treaties and strategies to obtain sufficient resources and services to enable the treaty bodies to carry out
their respective mandates efficiently.” Id., at 223, note 158.
466
See id., at 243.
467
“States will, of course, struggle to retain sovereign authority to make fundamental policy choices
consistent with national values and needs. Nevertheless, all States must accept constraints on their
freedom of action in order to obtain the considerable benefits of collective, supranational regulation
and to promote more humane systems of governance”, Derek P. Jinks, The Legalization of World
Politics and The Future of U.S. Human Rights Policy, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 357, 376 (2002).

96

2. The Conflict.

i. A traditional reluctance from States.
As we have seen, in the delicate area of human rights, states are generally
disinclined to submit themselves to the adjudicative powers of an international
judicial mechanism. They traditionally fear the possibility of abusive complaints and
infringement on their national sovereignty.468 Thus, when the creation of monitoring
bodies was proposed to ensure the enforcement of the International Bill of Rights,
states attached importance to delimitate the prerogatives of these organs precisely.
With respect to reservations, they could not agree on the role that these bodies should
play, and therefore provided them with no specific powers. However, this omission
does not imply that the states parties would rely on the treaty bodies to decide on the
legality of reservations.469 On the basis of the principle pacta sunt servanda, “the
bodies monitoring universal human rights conventions did not have such competence
unless it was expressly attributed to them by the state parties. They should therefore
function strictly in conformity with their mandate.” 470 The dynamism of the treaty
bodies might indeed have severe consequences on states’ practice. States will
certainly be more and more reluctant to submit themselves to any kind of international
monitoring system if they know that the limits they placed on the system will be
progressively removed under the influence of the supervisory organs. Therefore, the
improved legal certainty that treaty bodies bring to human rights law by controlling
reservations is somehow removed from treaty law. Yet, states have a fundamental
468

See Gérard Cohen-Jonathan, Les Réserves dans les traités relatifs aux Droits de l’Homme , 1996
REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 915, 920 (1996).
469
See Baylis, supra note 58, at 296.

97

interest in protecting the certainty and stability of treaty law. To limit this kind of
development, states might simply abstain from entering human rights regimes with
“harsher reservations policy.”

471

States’ reactions to General Comment 24 demonstrate the difficulties to
implement a new reservation law on the basis of U.N. treaty bodies practice. Several
Asian and African countries have protested to the HRC position on reservations.472
But the most virulent contestations came from France,473 the United Kingdom474 and
the United States,475 which were certainly the countries implicitly targeted by General
Comment 24. Their strong opposition is also understandable considering that they
would probably be the first victims of a new reservations system.
The example of the United States’ reaction is particularly explicit. It considers
that the Comment violates both the ICCPR and general international law, and that the
HCR has no competence to decide on the legality of reservations.476 But the American
reaction was not limited to an official protestation. The United States Senate
attempted to sanction the HRC by conditioning federal funds for the implementation
of the ICCPR to the revocation of General Comment 24.477 The Senate wanted to
ensure that the validity of the various reservations, declarations and understandings
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that the United States had attached to its ratification of the Covenant would not be
severed. However, President Clinton finally vetoed the attempt of the Senate.478 Other
punitive solutions were considered, but so far, no concrete action has been taken.479
Of course the reaction of the United States is a bit extreme and must be analyzed in
the context of the agitated history of the U.S. ratification of the ICCPR.480 However, it
represents the general opposition of states to the emergence of a new reservation
regime.
The principles adopted by the HRC in its General Comment on reservations
were not new. They had been extensively discussed by the doctrine and were not
ignored by states’ administrations. The revolutionary nature of the Comment was
therefore very relative. What truly constituted a radical change was the
institutionalization of these principles in an official act of a U.N. treaty body. States
realized the potential consequences of this change and strongly reacted to prevent the
propagation of the HRC audacity to its sister bodies. This reaction can be explained
by the fact that states have a strong incentive to maintain the current system of
reservations, which highly favors their interests.481 Changes in international public
law do not occur instantly. They are the result of a long process and require the
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consent of the traditional actors of the international legal system. States are one of
them. The United Nations International Law Commission is another one.

ii. The ILC Report.
The International Law Commission is a permanent institution created for the
codification and development of international law and is the expert body of the United
Nations on international law.482 It is responsible for the codification, among other
things, of the law of treaty in the Vienna Convention. As we have seen, the ILC has
dealt with the law of reservations since the very beginning of the debate.483 It was
therefore logical that it would respond to the mini-revolution caused by the HRC’s
General Comment 24. In 1997, at its 49th session, the ILC heard the report of
Professor Alain Pellet, the Special Rapporteur on reservations to multilateral treaties,
who especially addressed the problem of the application of the Vienna Convention
reservations regime to human rights treaties.484

If the ILC is charged with the development of international law, it is
nevertheless known for its traditionalist vision. This is partly explainable if one
considers that ILC members are elected by the United Nations General Assembly on
the basis of a list of candidates submitted by the member states. Even though the ILC
members are supposedly independent, they often are closely related to their
governments, which, most of the time, were their former employer.485 In any case, the
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ILC usually looks at the issues submitted to it on a broad and general perspective,
what sharply contrast with the practice of human rights treaty bodies. If the decisions
of the HRC have an applicability limited to the scope of the ICCPR, the decisions of
the ILC have a much broader scope of application, and can have serious repercussions
on other areas of international law. The contrast between the dynamic nature of the
treaty bodies and the traditionalism of the ILC explain their conflicting views over the
reservations issue to a certain extent, but other factors also have to be taken into
account.

Of course, “the topic of reservations was not terra incognita for the
Commission.” 486 Indeed, the ILC is partly responsible for the failure of the Vienna
Convention reservation regime. It was first reluctant to the creation of a compatibility
test, but faced with the necessity of a flexible approach, it pushed for a compromised
which would not endanger the sovereignty of states to a too large extent.487 The result
was a pseudo-objective system totally inadapted to human rights conventions. After
General Comment 24, the ILC realized that the fruit of its work, the Vienna
Convention regime, was “under fire”

488

and that it had to react.

It responded by reaffirming the authority of the Vienna Convention which
“generally

worked

satisfactorily”

notwithstanding

uncertainties,” 489 and should therefore be “preserved.”

certain
490

“ambiguities
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The report also stated that

the applicability of the Vienna Convention reservation regime to human rights
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conventions should not be contested;491 and that states remains charged with the
enforcement of the object and purpose test, even though international human rights
bodies could address the question of the permissibility of reservations “when
necessary for the exercise of their functions.” 492 However, due to their nonjurisdictional nature, and unlike their regional counterparts, they had no binding
authority to decide on the legality of a reservation.493 The report concluded that “the
legal force of the findings made by monitoring bodies in the exercise of their power to
deal with reservations cannot exceed that resulting from the powers given to them for
the performance of their general monitoring role, […] in the event of inadmissibility
of a reservation, it is the reserving state that has the responsibility for taking
action.” 494

Naturally, the report is subject to changes and the views of the ILC are not
definitive.495 However, considering its state-centered approach,496 it is unlikely that
the ILC will go further and recognize the authority of human rights treaty bodies to
adjudicate the legality of reservations to human rights conventions. Indeed, although
it acknowledged the inherent capacity of these organs to “comment upon and express
recommendations with regard, inter alia, to the admissibility of reservations by states,
in order to carry out the functions assigned to them,” 497 the ILC, like states, still
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strongly opposes the HRC’s position on the highly controversial question of the
severability of incompatible reservations.

D. Evaluation.

The idea of treaty bodies responsible for the determination of the validity of
reservations to human rights convention is not new. It results from the failure of the
Vienna Convention reservation regime, or the failure of states, to ensure that the quest
for universality through a flexible use of reservations would not endanger the integrity
of human rights treaties. Practice has shown that these organs were the most qualified
to handle this controversial challenge and that they had a natural functional authority
justifying their actions. However, states and other institutional actors oppose further
developments and resist the emergence of a new reservations law. The fear of a new
system of reservations, which would maintain an effective balance ensuring more
integrity for human rights, is based on the presumption that any change in favor of
human rights integrity would threaten states’ sovereignty. We will see that although
the severability doctrine partly justify the apprehension of states, the emergence of
new principles of reservations law are consistent with the evolution of the
international society.

1. The unsettled severability controversy.

Once the competence of treaty bodies to review the legality of reservations is
accepted, the debate over reservations is not over. Indeed, the most sensible issue
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remains: what to do with an incompatible reservation? International law, through the
doctrinal debate, has provided three different solutions.
The first solution consist to consider the incompatible reservation as void, and
to regard the reserving state as bound by the treaty, with the exception of the
disposition to which the invalid reservation was related to.
Secondly, the invalidity of the reservation affects the ratification of the treaty
as a whole, and therefore, the reserving state is not a party to the treaty anymore.
Finally, the invalid reservation is separated, or severed, from the instrument of
ratification, and the state remain bound by the treaty as a whole, without the benefit of
the reservation.

The first solution appears implausible. Indeed, the declaration of the illegality
of the reservation would have no legal effect because the provisions of the treaty it
objected to, would still not bind the reserving state, whether or not its reservation was
valid. Thus, the state would remain in the same position, and the reservation would be
given full effect, notwithstanding its illegality. This solution cannot be defended,
because it affects the interest of all other parties. The object and purpose test is aimed
at the protection of the integrity of the treaty, which consists in the elements that have
been bargained and agreed upon by the parties. Consequently, an illegal reservation,
that is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty, affect the interest and consent
of every other party to the treaty (or at least of those which did not explicitly accept
the incompatible reservation). As a result, this solution “is not viable under
contemporary treaty practice.” 498
498
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In its General Comment 24, the Human Rights Committee adopted the
severability option. For the HRC, “the normal consequence of an unacceptable
reservation is not that the Covenant will not be in effect at all for a reserving party.
Rather, such a reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant
will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation.” 499 This
solution is based on a presumption that the state’s intent to be bound by the treaty as a
whole was superior to its intent to be bound by the treaty as modified by the invalid
reservation. The decision of the HRC seems to have been inspired by the precedents
created by the European organs, which first used “the presumption in favor of
successful ratification” 500 to severe invalid reservations.501 What is striking is that,
notwithstanding the important consequences of the severability solution, neither the
European Court, nor the HRC, made the effort to explain and justify their decision.
For the European Court, it was “beyond doubt that Switzerland [was], and regard[ed]
itself as, bound by the Convention irrespective of the validity of the declaration.” 502
For the HRC, the severability of the invalid reservation was a “normal
consequence.” 503

However, the solution of severability is far from being undisputed. Declaring
the invalidity of a reservation is an “ acte grave,” 504 because it substantially affects and
partially denies one of the most important principles of international law: state
consent. Under the general maxim pacta sunt servanda, a state is presumed to be
499
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bound only by what it has agreed to. Considering that a reservation allows him to
exclude dispositions of a treaty that it does not want to be bound by,505 it is a specific
“indication of non-consent.”

506

Thus, applying severability is in contradiction with the

principle of state consent because a state ends up being bound by a disposition of a
treaty that it has especially rejected.507 Under the Vienna Convention, the will of state
is the superior element of treaty law which has a consensual nature,508 therefore, it
should not suffer contradictory presumptions such as the one used by the European
Court and the HRC. If the decision of the European court can be justified and
accepted in the particular context of the Council of Europe, it is very doubtful that it
can be transposed at the international level.509 In the European context, the
Convention is considered as a constitutional instrument, and the states concerned by
the illegal reservation expressly admitted that they intended to be bound by it
regardless of the fate of their reservations.510 It is argued that in the context of the
ICCPR, the United States’ reservations declared incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty (but not severed yet) by the HRC were explicitly considered as
“integral parts” of the United States’ consent to be bound by the Covenant.
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severability of its reservations would therefore be in contradiction with principles of
international law.512
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Nevertheless, the fact that certain reservations are considered as “integral
parts” of a consent to be bound by a treaty leave the possibility that some reservations
might no be essential to the consent to be bound. When first faced with the question
of the severability of reservations, Judge Lauterpacht considered if reservations were
conditions sine qua non of the acceptance of a treaty.513 This ‘essentiality test’ seems
to reflect the reality of reservations. Considering that the efficiency of the
acceptance/objection game of the Vienna Convention is very relative -because it
depends on the ability or willingness of states-514 a state is usually not afraid of
submitting “a package of reservations” that “reflects the ideal relationship it wishes to
have in relation to the treaty, not the essential one it requires so as to be bound.” 515
Therefore voiding unessential reservations would not affect state consent to a great
extent.
However, this implies that one can differentiate between essential and
inessential reservations, which might reveal to be a very difficult exercise. First,
because the a posteriori analysis might take place at a moment were the rationale
behind reservations do not exist anymore, or do not have the same intensity; secondly
because it involve delicate political considerations.516 Only the state itself might be
able to evaluate the importance of the reservation at the time of its consent,517 because
the use of the travaux préparatoires for this purpose can be very delicate.518 The use
of presumptions to determine the issue seems appropriate because it allows a certain

513

See Schabas, supra note 354, at 318; Bourguignon, supra note 408, at 380-381; both referring to the
Interhandel Case, Switzerland v. United States, 1959 I.C.J. 6 (March 21).
514
See supra I.B.1.
515
Goodman, supra note 232, at 537.
516
See ILC Report II, supra note 108, at para.140.
517
Id., at para.83.
518
See the example of the Belilos case, supra note 408, at paras. 45-49.
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amount of certainty but does not prevent the emergence of contradictory evidence.
But which presumption?

A traditional perspective based on the principle of state consent, adopted by
states, the ILC and even some members of the HRC,519 would favor the presumption
that a reservation means what it means, and that the state did not intend to be bound
by the dispositions of the treaty it rejected through the use of reservations. Thus, the
severability of the invalid reservation is impossible, and the result of the illegality of
the reservation is that the state is not a party to the treaty anymore. The main question
that was asked by those who opposed the severability option was why should the
presumption based in the traditional rule of state consent be inversed? 520

A very convincing answer has been elaborated by Ryan Goodman. He
explains that “reservations to human rights treaties should be presumed to be
severable unless for a specific treaty there is evidence of a ratifying state’s intent to
the contrary.” 521 According to him, the ‘anti-severability’ position does not reflect the
complex structure of state consent, whereas a reservations regime that would permit
severability would maximize the protection of state consent.522 The severability
option actually leaves the state with the possibility to decide what is the most
appropriate solution, and “to weigh the interest served by the particular reservation
against the cost of voiding the act of ratification.” 523 Without severability, the state

519

See Goodman, supra note 232, notes 4, 5, 6 and 7, at 532.
See Baylis, supra note 58, at 304-305.
521
Id. at 531.
522
See id. at 532.
523
Id. at 546.
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would be forced to drop out the treaty, for the sake of an invalid reservation, which
most of the time actually reflect technical or minimum disagreement.524 States’
consent to ratify a human rights treaty is often the result of a long and difficult
process, and is justified by many objectives. These objectives might very well be of
superior interest than the one expressed within a reservation. Therefore, the traditional
argument that views every reservation as fundamental to states’ consent seems
radical. State consent might actually be better protected by leaving the choice to the
state to maintain a reservation and lose the benefit of the treaty membership, or
withdraw its reservation and preserve a membership that it had won with difficulties
at the domestic level. The price of a re-ratification might be superior to the price of a
severed reservation. Assorted with certain safeguards,525 the severability regime
would be flexible enough to maintain the integrity of human rights treaties through
the elimination of reservations incompatible with their object and purpose, and permit
states to ensure the self-protection of their consent.

However, the debate over the severability doctrine remains a pure intellectual
exercise. Outside the regional forum, severability is a chimerical concept. So far, the
HRC has abstained from severing any reservation, even the reservations that he has
found incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR.526 The explanation is
simple: the decisions of the HRC and other human rights treaty bodies have no
binding authority. That is why only few states have officially reacted, and no more
than with an official declaration of disagreement. Unless they give an express
524
525

See generally, Gamble, supra note 17.
See Goodman, supra note 232, at 555-559.
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adjudicative authority to the treaty bodies, states can simply ignore their decisions.
Under positive international law, states remain the masters of reservations law. When
faced with the declaration of incompatibility of their reservations, states have several
options: “(a) the state could, after having examined the finding in good faith, maintain
its reservation; (b) the state could withdraw its reservation; (c) the state could
regularize its situation by replacing its impermissible reservation with a permissible
reservation; (d) the state could renounce being a party to the treaty.” 527
If states have generally ignored the boldness of the treaty bodies, treaty bodies
have also demonstrated very little concern about the reaction of states. Actually, the
severability debate highly resemble to a ‘deaf dialogue’. The best treaty bodies can do
is to continue to assess and exercise their valuable competence in the evaluation of
reservations within a constructive dialogue with states. Until the severability option is
accepted as the best mean to ensure a balance between the integrity of human rights
and the protection of state consent, human rights treaty bodies will have to continue
their struggle against the application of the Vienna Convention reservation regime to
human rights treaties with their traditional weapons: dialogue, harassment, public
opinion and the mobilization of shame.528 On the other hand, their chance to win the
battle over an obsolete regime might increase with the emergence of modern concepts
of state sovereignty that reflect the necessary evolution of international law in the 21st

526

See Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America,
CCPR/C/Add.50; A/50/40, 3 October 1995, at para. 279.
527
ILC Report II, supra note 108, at para. 86.
528
“In the human rights area, treaty regimes are notoriously weak, and national governments, for
reasons of economics or realpolitik, are often hesitant to declare openly that another government
engages in abuses. In such area, where enforcement mechanisms are weak, but core customary norms
are clearly defined and often peremptory (jus cogens) the best compliance strategies may not be
‘horizontal’ regime management strategies, but rather, vertical strategies of interaction, interpretation,
and internalization.” Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J.
2599, 2655-2656 (1997).
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century. As Professor Tyagi explains, “how can states continue to live with their
sovereignty-centric mindset in the field of human rights? Logically, if globalization
can flourish without altering national boundaries, human rights too can flourish
without eliminating national identities. Conversely, if national boundaries can survive
the process of globalization, reservations too can survive universal standards of
human rights.[…] [T]he momentum of a new world order will not allow reservations
to remain unchallenged. While states will continue to rely on reservations for
accommodating their conflicting interests, the global community will increasingly
exercise its right to question the discretion of states. As a result, reservations will
come under greater scrutiny.” 529

2. “New Sovereignty,” reputational costs.

One of the most severe criticisms of the HRC and the European Court
severability doctrine has been their misguided strategy. The treaty bodies certainly
wanted to enhance and strengthen the human rights regime by creating a stronger
enforcement mechanism. However, many commentators have seen this constructive
tactic has erroneous.530 According to them, the severability doctrine could only
weaken the system. Indeed, they see the severability solution has a great threat on
states’ national sovereignty that will discourage them from entering human rights
treaties, or push them to drop out of the international human rights regime. This fear
is certainly justified on the basis of a traditional perception of states’ sovereignty.
However, it seems necessary to reconsider the argument in the light of the evolution
529

Tyagi, supra note 14, at 255.
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of the concept of sovereignty. Does traditional national sovereignty has the same
meaning in today’s globalized and interdependent world than at the time of the
Vienna Convention?

States’ sovereig nty unquestionably remains the most important element of
positive international public law.531 In practice, it also remained the most invoked
argument by states to oppose international action or cooperation.532 However, it is
also undeniable that the notion of states having the sole and exclusive authority to
control every activity within their territory is obsolete.533 The development of the
transnational society have imposed duties and imperatives of international
cooperation to states, that now have to deal with international organizations which
increasingly regulate part of the national life. This evolution has led some thinkers to
notice the emergence of a “New Sovereignty.”

534

The argument is worth quoting at

length: “Traditionally, sovereignty has signified the complete autonomy of the state to
act as it chooses, without legal limitation by any superior entity. The state realized and
expressed its sovereignty through independent action to achieve its goals. If
sovereignty in such terms ever existed outside books on international law and
international relations, however, it no longer has any real world meaning. The largest
and most powerful states can sometimes get their way through sheer exertion of will,
but even they cannot achieve their principal purposes -security, economic well being,
530
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and a decent level of amenity for their citizens- without the help and cooperation of
many other participants in the system, including entities that are note states at all. […]
That the contemporary international system is interdependent and increasingly so is
not news. [The] argument goes further. It is that, for all but few self-isolated nations,
sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their
perceived self-interest, but in a membership in reasonably good standing in the
regimes that make up the substance of international life. To be a player, the state must
submit to the pressures that international regulations impose.” 535
According to this thesis and considering the increasing role that human rights
law have played in contemporary international law, states’ participation in the
international human rights regime would be an essential element of their sovereignty.
This conclusion is very paradoxical and reflects the complexity of the modern
international system: participation to human rights conventions constitutes one of the
greatest threat on traditional states sovereignty, but also one of the main element of
their “New Sovereignty.”
Consequently, nothing really prevents the severability doctrine to become part
of international law. The fate of the doctrine will depend on the reaction of states.536
Yet, some leading states (within the new sovereignty approach) have already
officially expressed their support for the severability doctrine and demonstrated a very
positive reception of the dynamic practice of human rights treaties bodies with respect
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to reservations.537 Their futuristic, or modern, vision might very well gained support
in the coming years.

The other argument that states might simply withdraw from human rights
regimes with harsher reservations policies is also relatively incoherent. The possibility
of a United States’ withdrawal from the ICCPR is often cited. 538 It is indeed, an
example of particular relevance, which demonstrates the improbability of the
experience.
Firstly, the withdrawal is legally impossible. The ICCPR does not provide for
such a possibility, and according to the requirement of the Vienna Convention,539
general international law does not permit withdrawal in this particular context.
Indeed, the nature of the Covenant, which is part of the International Bill of Rights,
does not imply a possibility for withdrawals, which would affect the legislative value
of the treaty. Moreover, it is very doubtful that such a possibility can be proved to
result from the intent of the drafters of the ICCPR.
Secondly, “to generate predictions about state behavior, one must have a
theory about the magnitude of the reputational loss resulting from violations of
law.” 540 In the present case, the United States government is certainly aware of the
catastrophic consequences that such an act would have. The reputational costs541 of a
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withdrawal from one of the most important instrument for the protection of human
rights are simply too high. They are even higher than the cost of non-adherence,
which the United States could already not face.542 Domestically, problems might not
even arise: American citizens certainly enjoy the benefits of the highest human rights
standards in the world.543 At the international level however, the consequences might
be slightly different. Because the United States is using its status of human rights
leader in the world as one of the main instrument of foreign policy,544 it certainly
could not afford the price of a mobilization of shame campaign concerning its human
rights policy.545 As a matter of consistency, the United States will not be able to
remain a “flying buttress rather than a pillar in the cathedral of human rights,
choosing to stand outside the international structure supporting the international
human rights system, but without being willing to subjects its own conduct to the
scrutiny of that system.” 546 Therefore, in the case of the development of the
severability doctrine in international law, the United States would face an important

(2002); Harold Hongju Koh, supra note 528; Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations
Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959 (2000).
542
See Schabas, supra note 254, at 235.
543
With the notorious exception of the death penalty.
544
“The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United
States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. Accordingly, a principal
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added). See also, Warren Christopher, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: WHERE AMERICA STANDS, 4
Dispatch 441 (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs June 1993), available at
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dilemma.547 It is very likely that the solutions to this challenge will be found within
the domestic realm,548 where the roots of the reservations problem remain.

547

“Countries engaged in ongoing interactions and facing a high cost for violations of international law
have a great deal to gain from a system in which they are able to select from a menu of commitment
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The issue of reservations to human rights treaties will survive to this modest
study of the problem. Reservations are a necessary evil to human rights law: treaties,
the primary source of modern human rights law, could not survive without
reservations. But can human rights law survive to reservations?

The law of reservations will continue to reflect the transformation of the
international legal order, just like it did during the last fifty years. Is the globalization
process going to proceed until the complete integration of the world into a single
community? If so, what kind of community will it be? Are the resisting forces going
to contain the transformations and succeed to ensure that world integration will
maintain a humane face? All these considerations are likely to influence the evolution
of international law. They will also certainly influence the debate on reservations,
shape the emergence of new rules, or permit the survival of old principles. Current
international events seems to suggests that states still have the ability to suddenly
inverse the tendency of increasing international cooperation. A recent re-apparition of
ancient concepts, combining nationalism, moral and spiritual values demonstrate that
states, or at least one of them, have the power to constrain the progressive evolution
of international law. In this context, it is doubtful that the concept of New
Sovereignty, fundamental to the emerging law of reservations, will survive to the
revival of past ideologies.
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The emergence of new principles applicable to reservations to human rights
treaties is the result of a long process; the solidification of this rising law might even
take longer. What is certain is that international law has so far succeeded to evolve
and adjust to the transformation of the world. When faced with the enlargement and
diversification of the international community, states have accepted to abandon some
privileges because the unanimity rule could not reasonably function in a post-colonial
world. The birth of the human rights movement transformed the contractual nature of
international law, and the International Court of Justice, a symbol of the world
community, demonstrated the need for a balance between universal and integral
acceptance for humanitarian conventions. The mechanism created then certainly
contained weaknesses and flaws, but the “object and purpose” test nevertheless
became an internationally accepted standard. It reflected the necessity and difficulty
to reconciliate the conflicting nature of treaty law and human rights law. The test
could have been improved and rendered practicable if an adapted enforcement
mechanism had been simultaneously implemented, but this has not been the case. The
Vienna Convention, by relying on a purely subjective and reciprocal system,
perverted the test into an abstract guideline and confiscated the only safeguard that
permitted the integrity of human rights treaties to survive to a perpetual and blind
quest for universality. The consequences were, if not catastrophic, very concerning.
Indeed, integrity and universality are so equally fundamental to human rights law that
the preeminence of an objective over another threatens the entire human rights
regime, to the detriment of individuals’ freedoms. Academics have reacted to this
important challenge by offering various solutions to reform the Vienna Convention
reservation regime as a whole, to rationalize it, or to promote the internalization of
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reservations rules. But the truth is that the international community cannot rely on
states to ensure the integrity of human rights, simply because they do not have the
capacity to enforce objectively an objective standard. Therefore, the solution consists
in the appointment of an independent and objective arbiter that would be charged to
ensure the compatibility of reservations to the object and purpose of human rights
conventions. There seems to be no better solution than to rely on the existing treaty
bodies.
Indeed, the very peculiar nature and composition of these bodies provide them
with a unique competence to deal with the complicated politico-legal aspects of the
validity of reservations to human rights treaties. The diverse and complementary
expertise of their members, associated with an incomparable understanding of the
treaty systems and their political implications provide them with the most appropriate
qualifications to deal with the sensible question of the compatibility of reservations.
Moreover, this competence is totally justified on a functional perspective. The
evolution of these treaty bodies’ powers and functions has revealed their capacity to
challenge the failures of the international legal system and confront states to provide
for an ever better respect for human rights. The dynamism of these organs, added to
the democratic, transparent and constructive nature of their procedures has pushed
states to admit their authority and competence regarding reservations issues.
Consequently, states have supported greater international scrutiny and conformed to
increasing international control of their human rights practice. Additionally, the
transformation of practice has provided a restricted, but solid, legal basis for the
emergence of a new reservation law administered by human rights treaty bodies.
Precedents at the regional and international level have demonstrated the suitability of
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the evolution of reservation rules towards greater integrity, through a flexible but
controlled use of reservations, and states have implicitly accepted it.

The remaining obstacle to the crystallization of the new principles of
reservation law is the opposition of states and other institutional actors to the doctrine
of severability. However, this conflict is not surprising. Treaty bodies simply try to
develop their authorities and powers to attain their objective of more integrity for
human rights through a better enforcement system, while states attempt to protect
their privileges and sovereignty. Realistically however, states remain in control of
international law and can therefore restrain the development of the severability
doctrine into law. Only when states will accept that their traditional prerogatives are
eroded and that it does not serve their interest in today’s integrated international
society to remain attached to obsolete and radical concepts of sovereignty, the
positive law will change. Until then, treaty bodies will certainly continue their
struggle to protect human rights treaties from abusive reservations. Hopefully the 21st
century will bring the definitive equilibrium in reservation law, and allow universality
and integrity to contribute equally to the development of human rights.
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